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TRANSFERS OF KNOW-How UNDER SECTION 351*
By JOHN L. RUPPERT** AND DAVID K. PANSIUS***
INTRODUCTION
Transfers of technical information, in particular, know-how,
by a domestic parent corporation to a controlled foreign subsidi-
ary pose difficult tax problems for the domestic parent. Section
351(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that:
[Nbo gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transfered to a
corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or
securities' in such corporation and immediately after the exchange
such . .. persons are in control2 . . .of the corporation. For pur-
* This article was made possible by a fellowship grant through the Denver law firm
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We also gratefully acknowledge the assistance and advice of Dean Christopher H.
Munch, University of Denver College of Law.
** B.A., 1975, Northwestern University; J.D., 1978, University of Denver College of
Law; LL.M. (Taxation) Candidate, New York University.
*** B.A., 1971, M.A., 1973, University of North Carolina; J.D., 1978, University of
Denver College of Law; LL.M. (Taxation) Candidate, New York University; Member of
the Bar, State of Colorado.
I If the taxpayer fails to receive stock or securities in exchange for the transfer of
property, the transaction will likely be treated as an ordinary sale or exchange. Any gain
in excess of the adjusted cost of the property transferred will be fully taxable. If, however,
the property qualifies as a capital asset under section 1221, and if the requirements of
section 1231 or section 1235 are met, a transfer of technology may qualify for special
capital gains treatment. See text accompanying notes 54-104 infra which discusses this
issue with respect to transfers of know-how in conjunction with transfers of patents, secret
formulas, and secret processes.
However, in certain circumstances even capital gains treatment will be denied trans-
fers of technology, even though the transaction would otherwise qualify for capital gains
treatment. Where the property exchanged is "a patent, an invention, model, or design
(whether or not patented), a copyright, a secret formula or process, or any other similar
property right," and the transfer is to a foreign corporation "controlled" by the transferor,
any gain will be taxed at ordinary rates. Control is defined as "more than 50 percent of
the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote." I.R.C. § 1249.
Thus if a transfer should fail because stock or securities in the transferee was not received
in exchange, or because the transferor did not have 80% control of the corporation after
completion of the transfer (see note 2 infra and accompanying text) but had the requisite
50% control, there will be no special capital gains rate applicable to the transfer.
Section 1249 would presumably come into play also when the taxpayer met the
requirements of section 351, but failed to comply with the requirements established under
section 367 with respect to tax-free transfers of property to foreign corporations. Other-
wise, if the transfer qualifies under section 351, there will be no taxable event, and the
transaction will not be subject to tax under section 1249. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B., at 1013. See J. BiscHL, TAXATION OF PATENTS,
TRADam1uKs, COPYIuGHrS, AND KNOW-How 6 (1974, Supp. 1976).
Control for the purposes of section 351 is defined in section 368(c) as "the ownership
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poses of this section, . . . services shall not be considered as prop-
erty.
Although in foreign transfers the transferor must also satisfy the
reporting requirements under section 367, 3 it is the ambiguous
of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other
classes of stock of the corporation."
Note that, under the new rules for section 1491 imposed by the Tax Reform Act of
1976, a transfer which fails to qualify under section 351 may be subject to a 35% excise
tax. Section 1491 imposes an excise tax of 35% "on the transfer of property by a citizen
or resident of the United States, or by a domestic corporation or partnership, or by a trust
which is not a foreign trust, to a foreign corporation as paid-in surplus or as a contribution
to capital, or to a foreign trust, or to a foreign partnership .. " The tax is imposed on
the difference between the fair market value of the property transferred and the sum of
the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the property and the amount of gain recognized to the
transferor at the time of the transfer.
The excise tax of section 1491 is not imposed on transfers which qualify for considera-
tion under section 367. I.R.C. § 1492(3). However, one should note that the excise tax
applies to transfers of "all types of property." S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 222,
reprinted in 1976-3 (vol. 3) C.B., at 260. Therefore, if one transfers technology to a foreign
corporation, and does not qualify the transfer under section 351 or a related section subject
to 367, and the Service considers that the transfer is paid-in surplus or a contribution to
capital, the rules of section 1491 will be applicable. A taxpayer can avoid section 1491
through such strategies as electing to be taxed on the latent gain in the property trans-
ferred under section 1057; or the transferor may seek an advance ruling from the Service
that the transfer is not for tax avoidance purposes. I.R.C. § 1492. See Alpert & Feingold,
Tax Reform Act Toughens Foreign Transfer Provisions of 1491 and Liberalizes 367, 46 J.
TAX. 2 (1977).
Note further that in any transfer subject to either general taxing rules or the special-
ized provisions of section 1491, the taxpayer cannot avoid tax by selling the technology
for less than fair market value in a transfer, sale, or exchange which is not at arms length.
The allocation rules of section 482 will adjust the transfer so that it will reflect "market
realities."
I Section 367 was created by the Revenue Act of 1932 primarily to foreclose schemes
designed to avoid taxation on the appreciation of capital assets. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1932). Prior to the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, if a taxpayer sought to make a tax-free exchange (under sections
332, 351, 354, 356, or 361) involving a foreign corporation, he would be required, in most
instances, to obtain advance approval from the Service. The taxpayer had the burden of
demonstrating to the Service "that such exchange is not in pursuance of a plan having as
one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income taxes." Int. Rev. Code of
1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 47, as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-681, § 1(a), 84 Stat. 2065
(current version at I.R.C. § 367(a)).
As often happens, the cure can be as distasteful as the disease. The principal problem
arising under the above provisions was the hardship which resulted from forcing the
taxpayer to await the decision of the Service before he could execute his exchange. If the
Service gave an adverse ruling, the taxpayer would have to consider further delaying the
transfer until litigation was completed. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION GENERAL Ex-
PLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 258, reprinted in 1976-3
(vol. 2) C.B., at 270 [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT].
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The new rules were thus designed to minimize notice requirements, and where notice
is required to make notice procedures more palatable. The Amendments first draw the
distinction between transfers into and out of the United States. Transfers out of the
United States will still be required to obtain approval of the Service. The taxpayer must
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Service that the "exchange is not in pursuance of a
plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income taxes."
However, this determination need no longer be made in advance. The taxpayer need only
file a request for a determination not later than the close of the 183rd day after the
beginning of the transfer. I.R.C. § 367(a)(1). The Act also provides that the Secretary may
designate certain out-bound transfers to be exempt from filing requirements, subject to
any toll charges arising under section 367. I.R.C. § 367(a)(2). These exemptions from the
clearance requirement are to be created for "outbound transfers where significant tax
avoidance possibilities do not exist or where the amount of any 367 toll charge can be
ascertained without a ruling request." S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., at 265,
reprinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B., at 303. A toll charge is in essence an agreement to include
in income certain of the items transferred.
For example, if a section 351 Transfer to a foreign corporation involves only
the transfer of cash and inventory property, the Secretary may by regulations
designate the transaction as one which does not require the filing of a re-
quest, although the regulations would require the inventory to be taken into
income.
JOINT COMM. REP. at 261, reprinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B., at 273.
With respect to inbound transfers, no filing is required. Instead, these transfers will
be judged according to regulations published by the Service. I.R.C. § 367(b).
To dissuade the Service from using section 367 as a broad sword to deny nonrecogni-
tion status to seemingly permissible potential nonrecognition exchanges, Congress ex-
pressly mandated judicial review of the Service's actions. Upon challenge, the Tax Court
is to review both the Service's conclusion with respect to tax avoidance in general, as well
as any specific conditions imposed by the Service in particular. JOINT COMM. REP. at 261,
reprinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B., at 273.
The Tax Court is to review whether the Secretary's determination as to tax
avoidance is reasonable and whether the conditions imposed in making the
determinations are reasonable conditions in order to prevent the avoidance
of income tax. If the Tax Court finds that the Secretary's terms and condi-
tions are not reasonable, then the Tax Court is to make a declaration as to
the terms and conditions which it finds to be reasonable in order to prevent
the avoidance of income taxes.
JOINT COMM. REP. at 262, reprinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B., at 274. With respect to inbound
transfers the Report also states:
These regulations are to be subject to normal court review as to whether the
regulations are necessary or appropriate for the prevention of avoidance of
Federal income taxes. Thus, a taxpayer may challenge a proposed deficiency
with respect to an exchange dealt with in the regulations by arguing in the
courts that the regulations, as applied in the taxpayer's case, are not neces-
sary or appropriate to prevent the avoidance of federal income taxes.
JOINT COMM. REP. at 263-64, reprinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B., at 275-76.
The Joint Committee emphasizes that section 367 rules are designated to prevent tax
avoidance only, and should be applied only to the extent necessary to meet this objective.
Although not meant to be exclusive, the committee provided examples of the ills which
section 367 was designated to cure:
Transactions in the first group [outbound transfers generally include those
transactions where the statutory aim is to prevent the removal of appreciated
assets or inventory from U.S. tax jurisdiction prior to their sale, while trans-
actions in the second group [inbound transfers] include those where the
1978
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language of section 351(a), not the added burden of section 367,
which poses the real difficulties for a taxpayer transfering tech-
nology to a foreign subsidiary. The current language of section
351(a) generates numerous unanswered questions.4 Specifically,
what forms of technology represent qualifying "property"? What
forms of technology are in essence services and thereby excepted
from the concept of property by the "services" exclusion in the
last sentence of section 351(a)? And finally, what forms of agree-
ments will qualify as actual "transfers" of rights, rather than
mere licensing arrangements? Without answers to these ques-
tions, a taxpayer must plan his international operations without
the benefit of foreknowledge of the tax consequences of his deci-
sions.
statutory purpose in most cases is to prepare for taxation the accumulated
profits of controlled foreign corporations.
JOINT COMM. REP. at 260, reprinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 3) C.B., at 272. Presumably, if a
transaction does not fit the mold of the prohibited avoidance schemes noted above, the
Service cannot use section 367 to deny nonrecognition status to the transfer. Examples of
items which the Service will not recognize as tax-free exchanges under section 351 can be
found in Guidelines regarding certain transactions involving foreign corporations requiring
an advance ruling under section 367 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Rev. Proc. 68-
23, 1968-1 C.B. 821, 823-25, § 3.02. For a discussion of the proposed regulations under
section 367, see Arthur & Paisley, Section 367: Working With the Temporary Regulations,
4 INT'L TAX J. 859 (1978). For a review of the new rules under section 367 published prior
to the issuance of the Service's proposed regulations on the subject, see Paisley, Section
367-A Look at the Recent Amendments, 4 INT'L TAX J. 692 (1977). Alpert & Feingold,
supra note 2. For an analysis of the Guidelines under section 367, see, e.g., Sitrick, Section
367 and Tax Avoidance: An Analysis of the Section 367 Guidelines, 25 TAX L. Rav. 429
(1970); Special Committee on Section 367 Policies, Tax Section, New York State Bar
Ass'n, Comments on Guidelines for Rulings under Section 367 Concerning Foreign
Corporations, 23 TAx LAWYER 151 (1969).
1 See, e.g., Cohen, Long-Awaited Ruling on Transfer of Know-How Sets Guidelines
in Important Areas, 21 J. TAX. 38 (1964); Flyer & Buell, Tax-free Transfers of Computer
Software to Foreign Corps: An Up-to-date Analysis, 41 J. TAx. 26 (1974); Note, Transfers
of Technical Know-How to Controlled Foreign Corporations, 5 VA. J. INT'L L. 81 (1964).
See also Dunn, The Transfer of Know-how to Controlled Corporations, 39 TAXEs 571
(1961), written prior to the issuance of Rev. Rul. 64-56. See generally, Dean, Transfers to
Controlled Corporations: Analyzing The Problem Areas, 41 J. TAx 72 (1974); Goodman,
How to Avoid Tax Problems Under Section 351 When Transferring Services in Exchange
for Stock, 55 TAxEs 112 (1977).
5 Some of the potential penalties of failing to qualify under section 351 are discussed
in note 182 infra. Although perhaps less likely to occur in the context of foreign transac-
tions, in some circumstances the taxpayer will purposely want to avoid the impact of
section 351. See, e.g., Fisher, The Conversion of Ordinary Income to Capital Gain by
Intentionally Avoiding Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code, 32 Mo. L. REv. 421




The taxpayer encounters the greatest difficulties when the
"property" to be transferred consists wholly or predominantly of
technical know-how. Very often, know-how consists of nothing
more than information. It may or may not be secret; it may or
may not be unique, novel, or original.' Very often the information
transferred represents little more than accumulated experience,
efficiencies, or skills that have been developed over time.7 Cer-
tainly such information is valuable to both the transferor and the
transferee.' But the test under section 351 is not explicitly one of
"value"; it is one of "property." ' What forms of valuable informa-
tion can the taxpayer qualify as "property"? Moreover, even
overcoming the property hurdle, what rights may the transferor
retain in the transferred information while still complying with
the transfer requirements under section 351?
This article will examine these questions. In so doing, the
authors will attempt to provide clarity to current taxing rules
which are at best ambiguous and at worst contradictory. The
analysis which follows addresses three major questions: (1) For
the purposes of know-how, how broadly have the words
"property" and "services" been construed in past tax law deci-
sions; (2) given the courts' treatment of these terms and in light
of recent trade secret developments, what specific forms of know-
how should qualify as "property" for the purposes of section 351;
and, (3) assuming that the information qualifies as "property,"
what forms of transactions qualify as "transfers" for the purposes
of section 351? In general the authors will attempt to highlight
those instances where the Internal Revenue Service has miscon-
strued the letter and the spirit of the words "property,"
"services," and "transfer," the operative language of section 351.
I. "PROPERTY" AND "SERVICES" WITHIN SECTION 351
As the cynical observer might expect, the Internal Revenue
Service has attempted to limit the term "property" to its narrow-
est construction, while broadening the concept of taxable services
' See text accompanying notes 162-165 infra.
See R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.09[3] (1977); Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 232.02[2] (1978); MacDonald, Know-how Licensing and the Antitrust
Laws, 62 MICH. L. REv. 351, 352-55 (1964); text accompanying notes 174-176 infra.
See text accompanying notes 155-171 infra.
' The authors later argue that the concept of value and of property are nearly synon-
omous. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 180-190 infra.
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to its fullest sweep. The Service's basic approach to the analysis
of know-how within the meaning of section 351 is set out in Reve-
nue Ruling 64-56.10 In this ruling, the Service conceded that items
which constitute property in the hands of the transferor will qual-
ify as "property" within section 351. "Once it is established that
'property' has been transferred, the transfer will be tax-free under
section 351 even though services were used to produce the prop-
erty."'" This statement of course begs the question of what is and
is not property. The Service also conceded that secret processes
and secret formulas are property for the purposes of section 351.12
However, as discussed below, there has never been a real dispute
as to whether these most protected of trade secrets fall within
section 351.11
Besides the statement that information "in the general na-
ture of a patentable invention" will be property, 4 the Service
provides little definition to the term "property" in the remainder
of its ruling. The Service does note that, at a minimum, informa-
tion must be secret and must receive "substantial" legal protec-
tion in order to qualify as a nonrecognition property transfer: "It
is assumed for the purpose of this Revenue Ruling that the coun-
try in which the transferee is to operate affords to the transferor
substantial legal protection against the unauthorized disclosure
and use of the process, formula, or other secret information in-
volved."' 5 Significantly, however, the Service did not state that
the presence in the transferee nation of legal protection is, in
itself, sufficient to make secret information property for purposes
of section 351. Thus, except for secret processes and secret formu-
las, the Service stands ready to challenge the "property" status
of secret information-even if that knowledge is afforded legal
protection as a valuable right: "Other information which is secret
will be given consideration as 'property' on a case-by-case
basis." 6
Left without any real guidance as to what constitutes prop-
1964-1 (Part 1) C.B. 133.
Id. at 134.
12 Id.
11 See text accompanying notes 44-52 infra,





erty, the taxpayer must cautiously analogize from the Service's
list of forbidden services:
(1) Training of the transferee's employees in various skills;
(2) continued technical assistance after the start-up phase;
(3) nonancillary assistance in the construction or layout of a plant,
machinery, or equipment; and
(4) other services performed for the transferee which are not
merely ancillary or subsidiary to the transfer of property."
This list of recognition transactions indicates that the Service
intends to tax at ordinary income rates any transfer that can be
catalogued as services to the transferee corporation. The only
exception occurs when the services are merely "ancillary and sub-
sidiary" to the transfer of property. 8 Since the term "property"
is left substantially undefined, and since the Service intends to
tax transfers of services, the taxpayer is forced to anticipate,
without guidance, the expansiveness with which the Service in-
tends to apply its definition of services.
Fortunately for the taxpayer, section 351 and the judicial
decisions interpreting the statute demand a different analytical
approach. From the historical analysis which follows, three basic
conclusions emerge: (1) Despite a trend of Service rulings to the
contrary, the term "property" is to be given its broadest defini-
tion;" (2) once transferred information is defined as "property,"
nonrecognition status is not lost merely because the transfer may
be construed as providing services;2 and, (3) even if the informa-
'* Id. at 134-35.
" Id. at 134.
" See E.I. DuPont de Nenours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211, 1218 (Ct. Cl.
1973). See also J. BlSCHEL, supra note 1, at 6.3; L. EcKSTROM, LIcENsING IN FOREIGN AND
DoMEsTic OPERATIONS ch. 4 (1977); R. MiLGmm, supra note 7, at ch. 1, 2, 6.4. In general,
commentators have argued strenuously for the broadest possible definition of the word
"property". See generally Dunn, supra note 4, at 572-73; Flyer & Buell, supra note 4, at
30; Nash, The Concept of "Property" in Know-how as a Growing Area of Industrial
Property: Its Sale and Licensing, 6 PAT., T.M., & CoPmGTrr J. RESEARCH & EDUC. 289
(1962); O'Connor, Tax Problems on Transfers of Assets to Corporations, 52 TAXES 756, 758
(1974). For a detailed discussion of this issue, see notes 25-42 and accompanying text infra.
" See Howard S. Gable, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427, 1431-33 (1974); Rev. Rul. 56, 64-1
C.B. 133. See also Burke, Section 351: The Beginning of Life in Subchapter C, 24 Sw. L.J.
742, 747-56 (1970); Cohen, supra note 4; Duffy, Doing Business Abroad: Use of American
Know-How, 20 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1269, 1269-73, 1299-1300 (1962); Dunn, supra note
4, at 572-575 (1961); Riebesehl, Tax Free Incorporations Under Section 351, 46 TAXES 360,
361-62 (1968); Weiss, Problems in the Tax-Free Incorporation of a Business, 41 IND. L.J.
666, 668-670 (1966). For a detailed discussion of this services issue, see notes 30-31, 62-63
and 73-103 and accompanying text infra.
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tion is in fact services, and not a transfer of property, there will
be no adverse tax consequences to the transferor as long as the
services are an "incident of" or related to, the transfer of prop-
erty. 2' In general, the term "services" is to be given its narrowest
definition and its most limited impact.
22
With respect to transfers of know-how, the effect of this con-
clusion is dramatic. Both the Service and the courts recognize
that know-how can be "property" within section 351. Neverthe-
less, a transfer of know-how in gross, i.e. unaccompanied by a
transfer of patents, secret processes, or secret formulas, can al-
most always be construed as little more than the performance of
services.7 Consequently, under the Service's guidelines as formu-
21 See Howard S. Gable, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427, 1431-33 (1974); Bell Intercontinental
Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004, 1020 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Heil Co., 38 T.C. 989, 1003
(1962). Until recently the commentators have focused almost exclusively on the Service's
"ancillary and subsidiary to" language. See generally Burke, supra note 20, at 747-56;
Campbell, Increasing Profits From Foreign Know-How Licensing, 45 DEN. L.J. 31, 32-34
(1968); Cohen, supra note 4, at 38-40; Duffy, supra note 20, at 1270-73, 1299-1300; Flyer
and Buell, supra note 4, at 29-30; Ladas, Legal Protection of Know-How, 7 PAT., T.M., &
CoYmor J. REARica & EDuc. 397, 401 (1963); Riebesehl, supra note 20, at 361-62; Weiss
supra note 20 at 668-69. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see notes 56-59, 67-104 and
accompanying text infra.
" See generally Note, Does IRS "Sale or Exchange" Theory Under 351 in Recent
Ruling Go Too Far?, 31 J. TAx. 53, 54 (1969) (The author .states that section 351 contains
no definition of property. "Services" are excluded under section 351(a) and such a singular
and extraordinary exception denotes the only exception to the term "property" under the
rule of statutory construction-expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one
thing is exclusion of another).) See also Cohen, supra note 4, at 39, where the author notes
that the Service's exclusion from property status of information developed for the trans-
feree under section 351 should be construed narrowly, distinguishing the production of
information specifically for the transferee from those instances where the transferee bene-
fits only indirectly from the transferor's general research. See also notes 67-103 and accom-
panying text infra.
1 See generally Howard S. Gable, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427, 1433 (1974) (in the sale of
technical information the buyer is likely to require technical assistance); United States
Mineral Prod. Co., 52 T.C. 177, 199 (1969) (assuming arguendo that technical information
constituted consulting services). See also Cooper, Tax Aspects of Corporate Exploitation
of Inventions and Know How, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 206, 206-07 (1965) (know-how is the
method of achieving a result); Creed and Bangs, Know-How" Licensing and Capital
Gains, 4 PAT., T.M., & COPYMGHT J. RESEARCH & EDUC. 93, 93 (1960) (know-how may
involve accumulated technical experience and skills which can best, or perhaps only, be
communicated through the medium of personal services); Duffy, supra note 20, at 1269-
73, 1299-1300 (know-how is inherently a personal attribute, an idea, or a skill, i.e., training
and experience); Flyer and Buell, supra note 4 (though there are tangible items in trade
secrets, technical knowledge is the primary value); Ladas, supra note 21 (know-how per-
tains to the method of achieving a result). For a detailed discussion of this issue, see notes
56-59 and 67-104 and accompanying text infra.
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lated in Revenue Ruling 64-56, and under even stricter interpreta-
tions which followed, a taxpayer must question if the transfer of
know-how in gross may ever qualify as a transfer of property if
the Service meticulously and mechanically applies its stated
standards.24 However, by broadly defining "property" and by
limiting the impact of the services exception, one reaches the
opposite conclusion, that the transfer of know-how in gross will
qualify as a transfer of property, at least to the extent that the
information is generally recognized as a legal protected interest.
A. The Historically Broad Approach to Section 351
One source of support for a broad interpretation of the term
"property" as used in section 351 may be found in the legislative
history behind section 202(c)(3) of the Revenue Act of 1921, the
predecessor of section 351(a).25 In a noteworthy passage from the
Senate Report, the purpose of section 202(c)(3) was succinctly
stated: The statute fashions new rules of nonrecognition "for
those exchanges or 'trades' in which, although a technical 'gain'
may be realized . . . the taxpayer actually realizes no cash
profit. 2 1 Further supporting the Senate Report's interpretation
Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133. For subsequent interpretations and applications of
this ruling, see Rev. Proc. 36, 1974-2 C.B. 491 (Rev. Proc. 69-19 is applicable to § 367
rulings on computer software); Rev. Proc. 10, 1973-1 C.B. 760, (general requirements for
a ruling under section 351) superseding Rev. Proc. 17, 1970-2 C.B. 490; Rev. Rul. 564, 1971-
2 C.B. 179 (transfers of trade secrets under section 351 must be exclusive for the entire
period prior to the secret's becoming public knowledge); Rev. Proc. 17, 1970-2 C.B. 490;
Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301 (conditions for a § 367 ruling as to transfers of know-how);
Rev. Rul. 156, 1969-1 C.B. 101 (must grant all substantial rights to a sale or exchange of
a patent to qualify under § 351). The Service's position prior to Rev. Rul. 64-56 may be
found in Rev. Rul. 17, 1955-1 C.B. 388 where the Service ruled that payments for know-
how and technical assistance transferred to a foreign corporation constituted royalty in-
come. It is critical to note that the Service specifically found that the services had only
nominal value apart from the license to use the know-how. For a detailed discussion of
these rulings, in particular Rev. Rul. 64-56 and Rev. Proc. 69-19, see notes 60-67, 121-181
and accompanying text infra.
" See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c)(3), 42 Stat. 230 (1921) (current version
at I.R.C. § 351(a)), The statute stated: "For the purposes of this title, on an exchange of
property, real, personal or mixed .. .no gain or loss shall be recognized . ..(3) when
(A) a person transfers any property .. .to a corporation, and immediately after the
transfer is in control of such corporation."
" See S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921). The language of the Senate
Report has subsequently been cited with approval in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
United States, 471 F.2d 1211, 1215 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Halliburton v. Comm'r, 78 F.2d 265,
269 (9th Cir. 1935); Ralph L. Evans, 8 B.T.A. 543, 546 (1927). See also Comment, Analysis




of the new statute, the Hearings before the Senate Finance Com-
mittee emphasized that new section 202(c)(3) was aimed at disre-
garding merely formal dispositions that lacked economic or com-
mercial reality.2 Finally, and perhaps of greatest importance, the
Hearings Explanation on the subsequent amendments to section
202 in the Revenue Act of 1924 emphasized that section 202(c)(3)
transactions involved no substantial change in ownership, and
thus no gain or loss was to be realized until an event equivalent
to a sale or exchange occurred.2 1 In summary, the historical devel-
opment of section 202(c)(3) and its successors indicates a legisla-
tive concern that lest purely formal and internal corporate rear-
rangements be impeded, a taxpayer should not be forced to recog-
nize gain or loss when in practical effect he is merely transferring
property to himself.
It was not until the passage of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code that Congress added the final sentence of section 351(a),
precluding the recognition of services as property.2 The accom-
' See Hearings Explanation of 202(c) Before the Senate Finance Committee, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 30 (1921). Language similar to that found in the Hearings has ap-
peared in numerous cases. See, e.g., Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc., 361 U.S. 527,
533 (1941) (section 202(c)(3) designed to permit readjustments); Six Seam Co. v. United
States, 524 F.2d 347, 355 (6th Cir. 1975) (aimed at technical transfers only-internal
rearrangements); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211, 1213-
15 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (aimed at mere form exchanges); Jordan Marsh Co. v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d
452, 457 (2d Cir. 1959) (citing Portland and Trenton); Barker v. United States, 200 F.2d
223, 228 (9th Cir. 1953) (citing the language in Portland); Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v.
Comm'r, 147 F.2d 33, 36 (6th Cir. 1945) (citing the Portland "mere change in form"
language); Portland Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
650 (1940) (where in a popular or economic sense there has been a mere change in the form
of ownership); American Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Bender, 70 F.2d 655, 657 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 607 (1934).
2 See S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 278 (1924); H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1924). For further discussion of these Reports, see Comment, supra
note 26, at 611. See also Magill, Notes on the Revenue Act of 1924 - Income Tax Provisions,
24 COLUM. L. Rav. 836, 841-44 (1924) for a brief review of the 1924 Act's amendments and
changes.
As noted above in Comment, supra note 26, at 612: "[The] same principle recurs
throughout the congressional hearings, debates, and committee reports pertaining to the
1934 amendments, which hold that purely formal 'paper' transactions . . . result in no
immediate tax consequences." See, e.g., S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934); H.R.
REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); Hearings on Revenue Revision Before the
House Ways and Means Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 58, 77, 290-91 (1934).
1 I.R.C. § 351(a) provides that: "For purposes of this section, stock or securities
issued for services shall not be considered as issued in return for property." See also Treas.
Reg. § 1.351.1(a)(1)(i) which states that: "[Stock or securities issued for services ren-
dered or to be rendered to or for the benefit of the issuing corporation will not be treated
as having been issued in return for property . ...
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panying House Report indicates that the exclusion of services
from the definition of property was designed to make the receipt
of stock or securities by a transferor who has rendered, or will
render, services to the transferee corporation, a fully taxable
event .3 The Report does contain a caveat, however, which states
that the committee did not intend the last sentence of section
351(a), the services exclusion, to vitiate the remaining portion of
the transaction; 31 bona fide transfers of property were to remain
non-tax recognition events.
In contrast to the legislative history behind many other pro-
visions of the Code, the legislative history behind section 351 has
played an integral role both in the interpretation of the specific
statutory language and the development of a uniformly liberal
response to the general purpose underlying the statute. For exam-
ple, one court has managed to turn the services exclusion in sec-
tion 351(a) into a basis of support for recognition of a broad defi-
nition of the word "property." In H.B. Zachary Co., the Tax
Court observed that the known inclusions and exclusions under
section 351 (implicitly referring to the services exception)
strongly suggested that property encompasses whatever may be
See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4017, 4254-56.
1' Id. at 4255. The language of House Report 1337 has served as support for numerous
attempts by various authors to limit the scope of the services exception. See, e.g., Burke,
supra note 20, at 750 (distinguishing services to the transferee, services for third parties,
and property created by personal services); Cohen, supra note 4, at 39 (services for the
transferee should be strictly construed); Goodman, supra note 4, at 113. (citing the lan-
guage of House Report 1337); Riebesehl, supra note 20, at 362; Weiss, supra note 20, at
668-670; Note, Income Tax - Tax Free Transfers to Controlled Corporations, 76 W. VA. L.
REV. 401, 404 (1973-74). Numerous judicial decisions have emphasized that "services for
the transferee" are the main thrust of the exclusion under § 351. See, e.g., Howard S.
Gable, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427, 1433-34 (1974) (distinguished nontaxable related services
from services rendered to the transferee to create or develop an invention); William A.
James, 53 T.C. 63, 67 (1969) (citing House Report 1337); Elihu B. Washburne, 27 T.C.M.
(CCH) 577, 591 (1968) (stock issued for the obtaining of an option was issued for services
rendered the transferee); Arthur C. Ruge, 26 T.C. 138, 142-43 (1956) (citing Kimble Glass,
a transferor's obligation to (1) further develop his invention, (2) disclose future inventions
to the transferee, and (3) keep the transferee informed of developments in the field were
unrelated to the products transferred and therefore were compensable services); Kimble
Glass Co., 9 T.C. 183 (1947) (see analysis in Ruge, 26 T.C. at 142-43). For further discus-
sion of the "services as property" concept, see notes 63-104 and accompanying text infra.
In Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301, Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133 and Tress. Reg. §
1.351-1(a)(1)(ii) (1954), the Service formally announced its position that services other
than "ancillary and subsidiary to" services rendered to the transferee are not property
within the scope of section 351.
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transferred.32 Based upon this assertion, the court went one step
further and, applying the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius to section 351(a), held that the services exception was the
only statutorily supported exclusion to the otherwise broad and
general meaning of the term "property." '
The court's conclusion in H.B. Zachary Co. that "property"
is to be given its broadest definition received recognition and
support in the 1973 Court of Claims decision, E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. United States.34 In 1959, the Du Pont Com-
pany granted its wholly-owned French subsidiary a royalty-free
nonexclusive license to make, use, and sell a patented herbicide
formula within the geographic bounds of France. Rejecting the
Service's argument which was based upon an unfounded analogy
between the word "transfer" in section 1235 and the phrase
"transfer . . . in exchange" found in section 351(a), the Court of
Claims held that: "[Ulnless there is some special reason intrin-
sic to the particular provision (as there is with respect to the
capital gains provisions) the general word 'property' has a broad
reach in tax law . . . .For section 351, . . . courts have advo-
cated a generous definition of property. . . . ,,5 In an attempt to
fashion guidelines delimiting the breadth of this seemingly
boundless language, the court emphasized that in this transac-
tion the nonexclusive license itself was commonly thought of in
the commercial world as a "positive business asset. '3 DuPont's
reference to a "positive business asset" test for property is pecu-
liarly well-suited to the analysis of issues involving the transfer
of nonpatented and nonpatentable technology, rights often de-
" 49 T.C. 73, 80 n.6 (1967).
3 Id. The expressio unius est exclusio alterius argument has been echoed in Note,
note 22 supra; Note, Carved Out Oil Payment Constitutes Property For Section 351
Purposes, 17 OIL & GAs Q. 69, 73-4 (1968). The Zachary decision is weakened however by
its failure to address the crucial issue; admitting that services are excluded from the
definition of "property," what constitutes services?
471 F.2d 1211 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
Id. at 1218. The Service argued that section 1235 (I.R.C. § 1235) which outlines the
necessary elements for a patent "transfer" to qualify as a capital asset exchange, also
governed the meaning of the words "transfer" and "exchange" under section 351. Id. at
1215-18. After rejecting the Service's argument, the court examined the scope of the word
"property" only for purposes of section 351. Id. at 1218. The DuPont rejection of this





fined in terms of the "competitive advantage" accruing to their
possessor.
37
Comparably broad language with respect to intangible rights
and assets may be found interspersed throughout much of the
applicable case law.38 Citing with approval the DuPont decision,
the District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, in Stafford
v. United States,3" held that, with respect to a lease and loan
agreement at interest rates below the market rate, property for
purposes of section 351 included any real, personal, tangible, or
'7 For a discussion of the "competitive advantage" and the "positive business asset"
test in trade secret law, see notes 115-190 and accompanying text infra. Applying the
"positive business asset" test, the DuPont court noted: "DuPont handed over something
of value and received stock in return .... " 471 F.2d at 1219.
" The breadth of the DuPont property definition is shocking at first glance; neverthe-
less, DuPont is not an isolated or single instance of such liberality. Numerous decisions
have espoused a similar test. See, e.g., Max A. Burde, 43 T.C. 252, 269 (1964), aff'd, 352
F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 966 (1966) (property right in an invention
comes into existence when it is reduced to actual practice-tested and operated success-
fully); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961)
(a trade secret is property because it conveys more than mere information; it confers an
economic advantage); Nelson v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1953) (secret process that
was valuable and reduced to tangible form constituted property); Halliburton v. Comm'r,
78 F.2d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1935) (the word "property" is used without qualification in
section 202(c)(3)); George S. Mepham, 3 B.T.A. 549, 553 (1926) (a secret process is prop-
erty where it is secret, valuable, and successful); Chrome Plate, Inc., 40 Am. FED. TAx.
REP. 2d (PH) 77-5316, 6125 (W.D. Tex. 1977) (citing DuPont and Hempt, the court held
that property should be defined as broadly as possible); Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United
States, 354 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (M.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974) (property is whatever may be transferred).
See also Duffy, supra note 20, at 1270-71 (citing Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947)
for the proposition that property is everything that is the subject of ownership); Dunn,
supra note 4, at 572 (most, if not all, types of know-how constitute property); Ladas, supra
note 21, at 397-409; O'Connor, supra note 19, at 758 (citing the 1973 DuPont decision, the
author suggests that there is no reason to restrict the definition of property); Riebesehl,
supra note 20, at 361-62 (trade secrets and patents will ordinarily constitute property, but
the secrecy requirement of Rev. Rul. 64-56 is subject to attack); Note, supra note 33, at
54 (citing the language of Zachary that property is anything that may be transferred). All
of the authors have advocated a broad meaning for the word property in an attempt to
bring at least trade secrets, if not all that is encompassed under the rubric of know-how,
within the scope of section 351.
" 435 F. Supp. 1036, 1038 (M.D. Ga. 1977). Interestingly, the Government raised the
argument that the agreement between the parties did not constitute a legally enforceable
contract and therefore could not constitute "property." In perhaps the most sweeping
dicta to date, the court rejected the Government's position stating that the enforceability
of the agreement was irrelevant; the parties, believing they were bound, did in fact per-
form. Id. at 1038-39. This language extends beyond even the DuPont, 471 F.2d at 1218-
19, and Zachary, 49 T.C. at 79-80, tests that previously applied only to legally enforceable
agreements, i.e., a nonexclusive license of a patent and a royalty agreement, respectively.
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intangible rights which the owner thereof could possess, use, or
dispose of. Definitions of equivalent breadth may also be found
in Commissioner v. Stephens-A damson Manufacturing Co.4 and
H.B. Zachary Co., 1 where the courts held that whatever may be
transferred constitutes property. Hempt Brothers, Inc. v. United
States, a 1974 Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision, has held
similarly that property consists of whatever may be sold or as-
signed. 2 Notwithstanding such generous language, any attempt
to analyze the scope of the word "property" for purposes of sec-
tion 351(a) merely by examining the dicta of past decisions will
be misleading. Often, the courts have been more sweeping in their
analyses and conclusions than required by the specific factual
setting before them.
B. The Development From Secret Formulas to Know-How
Despite the plethora of section 351 property cases before the
courts in the last fifty years, the body of law concerning trade
secrets and know-how under section 351 (in contrast to that con-
cerning patents) has been slow to develop. Both the courts and
the Service have struggled to define these intangible rights, as
well as to outline the proper tax treatment of their transfers.43
- 51 F.2d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 1931) (For purposes of determining the scope of section
202(a) of the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921: "We think it a fair definition to say that
what may be sold and assigned is property.")
" 49 T.C. 73, 80 n.6 (1967) ("Section 351 does not contain a definition of the word
'property.' However, the known inclusions and exclusions strongly suggest that the term
encompasses whatever may be transferred.") See also notes 32-33 and accompanying text
supra.
12 354 F. Supp. 1172 (M.D. Pa. 1973), modified, 490 F.2d 1172, 1175 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974). The court specifically stated that for purposes of section 351,
property is whatever may be identified, valued, and transferred. Such language, however,
adds little to the lower court's formulation of the test: "Whatever may be transferred."
354 F. Supp. at 1175. Again, the breadth of the Hempt test is tempered by the very
traditional nature of the property involved, accounts receivables. Compare Chrome Plate,
Inc., 40 AM. FED. TAx REP. 2d (PH) T 77-5316, 6125 (W.D. Tex. 1977) where the court
relied upon Hempt Bros. and DuPont to support the broad assertion that for purposes of
section 351 the courts were unanimous in holding that property should be contrued as
broadly as possible. See also O'Connor, supra, note 19 at 758, where the author argues
that there is a strong statutory basis for the DuPont-Hempt Bros-Chrome Plate line of
developments.
0 See notes 44-104 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the tax develop-
ments in the know-how area. The phrase "know-how" appears to be a phenomenon of the
last twenty years. As demonstrated by notes 44-52 and accompanying text infra, the
decisions prior to Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133 focused primarily on secret processes and
formulas, not know-how. There simply is no use of the phrase "know-how" in the tax law
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Focusing more specifically on trade secrets and know-how trans-
fers under section 351(a), the Service and the courts have been
most favorable to the transfer of secret formulas" and secret pro-
cesses. As early as 1927, relying on the legislative history of sec-
until the Service ruled that certain techniques and methods constituted know-how in
1955. See Rev. Rul. 17, 1955-1 C.B. 388. Beginning with Heil Co., 38 T.C. 989 (1962),
"know-how" has become a common phrase in the tax decisions. Unfortunately, "know-
how" has still not been defined with any specificity. It is the premise of this article that
the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 has implicitly been adopted by the Supreme Court as a
definition of the broad term "trade secrets." See the discussion at notes 105-121 and
accompanying text infra. The definition of "trade secret" found in the Restatement ap-
pears broad enough to include know-how. Numerous commentators have attempted to
fashion a definition of "know-how." See, e.g., Creed and Bangs, supra note 23, at 93;
Duffy, supra note 20, at 1269-73, 1299-1300; Dunn, supra note 4, at 572; Nash, supra note
19, at 289; Van Notten, Know-How Licensing in the Common Market, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV.
525, 526-27 (1963). See also BISCHEL, supra note 1, at 6-6 to 6-14.
In 1964, nine years after the Service first addressed the issue of know-how in Rev. Rul.
17, 1955-1 C.B. 388, the Service was still uncertain of what know-how meant. See Rev.
Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133 where the Service ruled that: "Since the term 'know-how' does
not appear in section 351 of the Code, its meaning is immaterial . . . the Service will look
behind the term . . . to determine.. ... .the terms . . . constitute property ....
In sharp contrast to the Service's inability to define "know-how" in 1964 is Treas. Reg. §
1.482-2(d)(3) where the Service for purposes only of proper allocation of income and
deductions among related taxpayers defined intangible property as "(a) Patents, inven-
tions, formulas, processes, designs, patterns. . . . (e) Methods, programs, systems, proce-
dures, campaigns, surveys, studies, forecasts, estimates, customer lists, technical data,
and other similar items." (Emphasis added.)
" See Edward W. Reid, 50 T.C. 33, 41 (1968) (secret formula constituted property);
Pickren v. United States, 378 F.2d 595, 599-601 (5th Cir. 1967) (secret formulas were
capital assets under § 1235); Commercial Solvents Corp., 42 T.C. 455, 467 (1964) (a secret
process is a capital asset as well as property); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United
States, 288 F.2d 904, 910 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (Government conceded that secret processes
constituted property); Nelson v. Comm'r 203 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1953) (secret processes
may constitute property); Ruth Neuberger v. United States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9264,
84166 (D. Ore. 1968) (secret formulas are property); Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209
F. Supp. 30, 33-34 (E.D. Mich. 1962) (trade secrets constitute property); Huckins v.
United States, 60-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9394, 76091-92 (S.D. Fla. 1960) (secret process treated
as a capital asset under section 1221).
For further recognition of secret formulas as property, see generally Benjamin, Tax
Aspects of Operating a Possession Corporation in Puerto Rico, 2 INT'L TAx. J. 197, 200-01
(1976); Cohen, supra note 4, at 38; Dunn, supra note 4, at 572 n.2; Hilinski, Is the IRS
Blocking the Tax-Free Transfer of Know-How to Foreign Corporations?, 23 J. TAx. 305,
305-06 (1965); Nash, supra note 19, at 94-99; Riebesehl, supra note 20, at 361-62.
The Service, since 1964, has officially recognized that secret formulas constitute
property for purposes of section 351. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 564, 1971-2 C.B. 179 (trade secret
remains valuable and therefore constitutes property only so long as it remains a secret);
Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301, (the Service requires that the taxpayer represent that the
information he seeks to transfer pursuant to sections 351 and 367 is secret, known only by
certain confidential employees, and is adequately safeguarded); Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B.
133 (property for purposes of section 351 includes secret processes and formulas).
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tion 202(c)(3), the Board of Tax Appeals, in Ralph L. Evans, held
that a corporate transfer of a secret hair-dye formula constituted
property for purposes of section 202(c)(3).15 One year earlier, in
George S. Mepham, the Board had accorded capital asset status
to (and ultimately capital gains treatment to the sale of) a secret
fume-trapping process.4" Again in 1948, the Tax Court, in Wall
Products, Inc.," advanced the burgeoning analysis one step fur-
45 8 B.T.A. 543 (1927). The Board succinctly disposed of the issue as to whether or
not the secret formula constituted property by the overly simplistic statement: "It is
admitted that he transferred the secret process to the Delaware corporation." Id. at 547.
See also William A. James, 53 T.C. 63, 68-69 (1969) where, based on Evans, the court
recognized that secret formulas constituted property for purposes of section 351, but held
such analysis inapposite to the transfer of purely services. The Evans decision was subse-
quently cited by the Service in Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133, 134, to support the Service's
acquiescence as to secret processes and formulas. Evans was also subsequently interpreted
more broadly than its language might support when Flyer and Buell noted that both
Evans and Wall Products, Inc., 11 T.C. 51 (1948) are framed in terms of trade secrets
generally being property. Flyer and Buell, supra note 4, at 27 n.14. This analysis may be
questionable in light of the fact that both decisions dealt explicitly with secret formulas
only. See also notes 46 and 47 infra, and note 44 supra.
- 3 B.T.A. 549, 553 (1926). The Board emphasized three factors: The process (1) was
clearly secret, (2) had proven to be successful, and (3) was never patented. Id. Mepham
was subsequently cited as support for the broad statement in United States Mineral Prod.
Co., 52 T.C. 177, 196-97 (1969), that the courts have long recognized industrial knowledge
and secret formulas, reduced to practice, as property. Although Mepham has been cited
in the case law only infrequently, it has received wide recognition in the legal literature.
See, e.g., Cooper, How a Corporation Can Get Capital Gains When Licensing Inventions
and Know-How, 24 J. TAX. 334, 334-35 (1966) (Mepham held a secret manufacturing
process to be intangible property); Duffy, supra note 20, at 1271 n.7; Sugarman,
Incorporating Tax Free - Basic Requirements Under Section 351 of the Internal Revenue
Code, 12 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 183, 186 (1961) (Mepham cited for the broad proposition
that goodwill, know-how, and trade secrets qualify as property under section 351).
, 11 T.C. 51, 57 (1948). The specific product involved was a highly successful
concrete-curing formula. Id. at 52-55. The court observed that without the inventor's
technical skills, manufacture of the product would have been impossible. Id. at 54. Recog-
nizing that a secret formula may constitute property, the court rejected the Service's
argument that application for a patent was a requisite element to a finding of property
status. Id. at 57. Subsequent attempts by the Service to make property status contingent
on the existence of a patent application have also been rebuffed. See, e.g., Max A. Burde,
43 T.C. 252, 269 (1964) aff'd, 352 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 966 (1966);
Franklin S. Speicher, 28 T.C. 938, 944-45 (1957); Samuel E. Diescher, 36 B.T.A. 732, 743-
44 (1937), aff'd, 110 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940); Comm'r v.
Stephens-Adamson Mfg. Co., 51 F.2d 681, 683 (1931). Similarly to Evans, (see discussion
in note 45 supra) Wall Prod. was cited with approval in Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133,
134. It is interesting to note that in United States Mineral Prod. Co., 52 T.C. at 197,
Mepham was distinguished from Wall Prod. on the grounds that the former was an
industrial knowledge case, while the latter was purely a secret formula decision. Compare
also Cooper, supra, note 46, at 335, (Wall Prod. recognized that a secret formula may
constitute property) and Duffy, supra note 20, at 1271 n.7 (Wall Prod. held a secret
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ther, holding that the property right in a patentable, but as yet
unpatented, secret formula was not negatived by a failure to file
a patent application. Finally, in 1961, in E.I. DuPont de Nemours
and Co. v. United States, the Service conceded that the transfer
of a secret process constituted the transfer of property."8
In light of the Government's concession in DuPont, it came
as little surprise in Revenue Ruling 64-56"° that the Service ruled
property to include such items as secret processes, secret formu-
las, and secret information concerning devices or processes with-
out regard to the existence of a patent or the patentability of
the asset in question.10 Again the Service's concession as to un-
formula to be property), with Flyer and Buell, supra note 4, at 27 n.14, where the authors
interpreted Wall Prod. as applicable to the broader field of trade secrets as defined by
the RESTATEMENT OF ToRs § 757 (1939). Id. at 28-29.
" 288 F.2d 904, 910 (Ct. Cl. 1961). Despite the Service's recognition that secret
formulas constituted property, the taxpayer failed to meet the "sale or exchange" require-
ment of sections 117, 1221, and 1231. Id. at 906-909. For further discussion of what consti-
tutes a "transfer" under section 351, see notes 197-241 and accompanying text infra. The
decision in the 1961 DuPont case has subsequently served as the foundation for any
extension of the property concept to include know-how and trade secrets related to trans-
ferred patents. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211,
1215-20 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Francis H. Shepard, 57 T.C. 600, 611-18 (1972), rev'd, 481 F.2d
1399 (3d Cir. 1973) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974); Taylor-
Winfield Corp., 57 T.C. 205, 214 (1971); PPG Indus., Inc., 55 T.C. 928 (1970); United
States Mineral Prod. Co. 52 T.C. 177, 199 (1969); Commercial Solvents Corp. 42 T.C. 455
468 (1964); Pickren v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 560, 561 (M.D. Fla. 1965), aff'd, 378
F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1967); Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 30, 33 (E.D. Mich.
1962); Rev. Rul. 564, 1971-2 C.B. 179, all know-how decisions citing the 1961 DuPont
decision.
" Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133.
Id. at 134-35. In summary the Service ruled that "The term 'property' for purposes
of section 351 of the Code will be held to include anything qualifying as 'secret processes
and formulas' . . . and any other secret information as to a device, process, etc., in the
general nature of a patentable invention without regard to whether a patent has been
applied for .. .and without regard to whether it is patentable in the patent law sense
. .. The Service, in Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301, 302, subsequently defined secret
information as that information "known only by the owner and those confidential employ-
ees who require the 'information'. . . and adequate safeguards have been taken to guard
• .. against unauthorized disclosure, and (b) .. .the 'information is original, unique,
and novel." To date, only Howard S. Gable, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427, 1433 n.3 (1974);
William A. James, 53 T.C. 63, 68 (1969); and Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States,
381 F.2d 1004, 1020 (Ct. Cl. 1967) have even mentioned Rev. Rul. 64-56 expressly; to date
no court has cited Rev. Proc. 69-19. For further discussion of the "absolute secrecy" versus
the "relative secrecy" doctrines, see notes 122-154 and accompanying text infra.
Numerous tax commentators have also questioned the need for an "absolute secrecy"
doctrine. See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 44, at 201 (contrasting Rev. Proc. 69-19, with
the language of DuPont, 471 F.2d at 1218); Cohen, supra note 4, at 38 (secrecy is question-
able in light of the 1961 DuPont decision, 288 F.2d at 910-12); Duffy, supra note 19, at
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patented secret devices or processes, in addition to secret form-
ulas, was merely the formal recognition of an already clear line
of judicial developments. Therefore, the Service's seemingly
broad concession on the patentability issue was less an act of
spontaneous generosity and more an official recognition of a dem-
onstrated judicial receptiveness toward transfers of such items.
For example, in 1940, in Samuel E. Diescher, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held that an inventor's property right in his
invention was not dependent upon his obtaining a patent, but
rather existed as a result of his reduction of the invention to
practice. 51 Seventeen years later in F. S. Speicher, the Tax Court
stated that the unpatented inventions in question constituted
property, for the transferor had a completed conception of his
invention and had previously expressed it in the form of drawings
and a physical machine. 2 In retrospect, there has been little if
any resistance to the recognition of unpatented secret formulas
and secret devices as property for purposes of section 351(a).
The courts, however, have yet to address the issue of what
1271-72 (secrecy alone should not be the test for whether an asset constitutes property);
Riebesehl, supra note 20, at 362 (whether secrecy should be an element at all); Weiss,
supra note 20, at 669 (citing Duffy, supra note 19, the author questions the need for a
secrecy element).
For a detailed discussion of the "unique, novel and original" test, see notes 155-171
and accompanying text infra.
" 39 T.B.A. 732, 743-44 (1937), aff'd, 10 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650
(1940). There is interesting language in Diescher to the effect that the inventor's rights in
his invention were common law rights. Id. at 743. The court cited with approval Six Wheel
Corp. v. Sterling Motor Truck Co., 50 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1931), where the Ninth Circuit
stated: "From the foregoing, it will be seen that the irreducible quantum of the inventor's
right in the res, even under the common law, is that of making, using and vending ....
The statutes (referring to the patent laws) certainly do not curtail the natural right; they
enlarge it." Id. at 571. From the specific facts before the court, i.e., transfer of an unpa-
tented but nevertheless patentable invention, Diescher has come to be interpreted so
broadly as to support the proposition that industrial knowledge and secret formulas re-
duced to practice constitute property. See United States Mineral Prod. Co., 52 T.C. 177,
196 (1969). One author has cited Diescher for the proposition that the products of a man's
mind are property whether they are tangible or intangible. See Duffy, supra note 19, at
1271. See also note 47 supra for further discussion of the concept of unpatented inventions
as property,
- 28 T.C. 938 (1957). The court rested its analysis on Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258,
265-66 (1946), an earlier decision where the Tax Court held that an invention becomes a
property right when it reaches the "completed conception stage." 28 T.C. at 945. The
Diescher-Speicher test has also been used in Max A. Burde, 43 T.C. 252, 269 (1964), aff'd,
352 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 966 (1966); Nelson v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d




forms of know-how or compilations of information, in and of
themselves, will qualify as property under section 351(a). To
date, the success of taxpayer-transferor attempts at transfering
technical information or know-how has hinged solely upon the
relationship between these rights and the other recognized forms
of property transferred .3 Except for a few early cases, the major-
ity of decisions addressing specifically the know-how issue have
been post-Revenue Ruling 64-56 decisions. One of the earliest
decisions to address the issue of whether know-how constituted a
capital asset was the 1947 Tax Court decision Kimble Glass Co."
In Kimble the transferor conveyed the rights to manufacture and
sell specific items under a German patent in conjunction with the
transferor's agreement to diligently develop his invention, to keep
the transferee informed of developments by others in the field,
and to submit to the transferee any offers or proposals he might
obtain for subsequent licensing of these rights. As might be ex-
pected, the court found all of these latter rights to constitute
services rather than property.55 Nine years later the Tax Court,
in Arthur C. Ruge, cited Kimble Glass Co. for the proposition
that requiring an inventor to (1) further develop his inventions,
(2) transfer future improvements to the transferee, and (3) use his
best efforts to promote and develop the particular business in-
volved constituted the performance of services resulting in ordi-
nary income to the transferor 0 More importantly however, the
court found that an agreement to provide a specific number of
man days of consulting service per year was "ancillary and sub-
sidiary to" the assignments of the inventions and was "of the type
11 One reason the courts have examined these assets from the perspective of their
interrelationship generally with patents is because the courts have not yet been faced with
the issue of transfers of know-how in gross. In fact, to date the courts have continued to
struggle with fleshing out the precise meaning of the phrase "know-how." See note 43
supra. For a detailed discussion of the requisite degree of interrelationship, see notes 56-
104 and accompanying text infra.
9 T.C. 183 (1947).
Id. at 186. However, petitioner entered into two agreements with a German busi-
ness. The first agreement provided for the sale of certain patented articles, certain ma-
chines for the manufacture of these articles, the furnishing of manufacturing and improve-
ment information, and the training and supplying of a mechanic. Id. at 185. In contrast
to the items in the second agreement, the court found none of these items in the first
agreement to constitute the performance of services. Id. at 191.
" 26 T.C. 138, 143 (1956). The court noted: "In the instant case, we are of the opinion
that the services called for by paragraph 6 . ..are similar to those held to be personal
services in Kimble Glass Co . .and . . . therefore constitute(s) ordinary income."
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and kind usually called for to implement the sale of highly techni-
cal and intricate inventions," and consequently afforded the
"services" property status.57
Ruge, therefore, represents the initial formulation of a black-
letter-rule for determining when certain assets, expressly recog-
nized as the performance of services, are sufficiently related to
other traditionally recognized forms of property transferred to be
accorded property status under section 351(a). The greatest con-
tribution of the Ruge decision was not its formulation of the
"ancillary and subsidiary to" test, but rather its generous and
liberal interpretation of the general "property" requirement
under section 351. The court in Ruge went so far as to grant
property status to assets that were inherently nothing more than
the performance of services, i.e. consulting assistance. A close
examination of the Ruge test, therefore, reveals that the court was
less concerned with formulating a definition of what constitutes
property and more concerned with formulating guidelines identi-
fying the requisite relationship or nexus between property and
services so as to qualify the entire package for section 351 treat-
ment. 58 Thus, the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test offers little
in the way of guidance to the taxpayer seeking to catalogue his
assets as qualifying property or nonqualifying services. The true
value of the test rests in its offer of property status, regardless of
the nature of the assets or services, if the requisite relationship
between those services and the recognized forms of property
transferred exists.
59
Taken at face value, the early rulings of the Service con-
" The specific purpose of the consulting services was to assist in the establishment
of subsequent control over the manufacturing operations of the actual inventions trans-
ferred. Id. at 139. Compare these services with those items found not to constitute services
in Kimble Glass Co. See note 55 supra. It is interesting to note that assets clearly classed
as services within the agreements themselves were treated as property. See note 58 infra.
" In both Ruge and Kimble Glass Co., the dichotomy between "ancillary and subsidi-
ary to," and unrelated, services was quite clear. In both cases, information and even
services directly related to the implementation of other recognized forms of property
transferred were given property status. See notes 55 and 57 supra. See also text accompa-
nying note 57 supra. In contrast, in these early decisions, services or information only
indirectly linked to the tangible property transferred, such as general future improve-
ments, other developments in the field, and future licensing offers, were denied property
status. 26 T.C. at 142-43.
" The decade following Rev. Rul. 64-56 has witnessed a continuing struggle to iden-
tify this requisite relationship. See notes 67-72, 101 and accompanying text infra.
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formed with the initial approach taken by the court in Ruge. In
Revenue Ruling 64-56, the Service attempted to formulate guide-
lines as to when know-how constitutes property for purposes of
section 351(a).10 The Service rejected the contention that the
mere reduction of know-how to documentary form automatically
accorded the information property status.6 ' In an attempt to be
more specific, the Service noted further that once an item was
found to be property, the fact that services were involved in the
production of that item did not constitute grounds for denying
property status to the entire transfer unless the items transferred
had been specifically developed for the transferee.12 However, rec-
ognizing that know-how may inherently consist of both property
and services, the Service adopted language identical to the Ruge
test, ruling that only those services that were "ancillary and sub-
sidiary to" the property transferred would be treated as
"property." 3
The Service soon retreated from its stance taken in Revenue
Ruling 64-56. Over the flexible and very liberal language of the
former ruling, the Service, in Revenue Procedure 69-19, grafted
more onerous requirements for determining whether the transfer
" Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133. See note 10 supra.
I d. at 134. To support its position, the Service cited Harold L. Regenstein, 35 T.C.
183 (1960), where the Tax Court found that the information and transfer of a group life
insurance concept constituted only the rendering of services, not property. The Service's
reliance on this case is questionable, however, for as the Regenstein court stated, all that
was involved was a release by the transferor of any claim he might have had for compensa-
tion for his services in developing the plan. 35 T.C. at 191. It is doubtful that the case
may be read as broadly as the Service urged.
11 Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. at 134. It is interesting that the Service again opted to
rest its position upon Regenstein, 35 T.C. 183 (1960) rather than H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra
note 30, at 4254-56. See also notes 11 and 12 and accompanying text supra. One explana-
tion for such analysis may be found in the breadth of the Regenstein holding in contrast
to the language found in House Report 1337. In fact, the court in Regenstein never ad-
dressed the issue of whether the plan or idea could be treated as property because in the
court's opinion the petitioners actions constituted only services. 35 T.C. at 190-91.
" Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. at 134-35. The Service gave the following examples of
what constituted "ancillary and subsidiary to" services: (1) promoting the transaction by
demonstrating and explaining the use of the property; (2) assisting in the effective
starting-up of the property; (3) performing under a start-up guarantee; or (4) further
educating the transferee's employees already possessing a modicum of basic skills. In
contrast the Service ruled that the following information failed the "ancillary and subsidi-
ary" test: "(1) training transferee's employees in new skills; (2) continuing technical
assistance; and (3) assistance in the construction of plants, machinery housing, or plant
layouts." See note 17 and accompanying text supra. For a more detailed discussion of the
ruling, see Cohen, supra note 20. See also notes 122-179 and accompanying text infra.
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or know-how would qualify as a section 351(a) property transfer
under the prior approval requirements of section 367.4 First, the
Service ruled that transferable information must be secret,
unique, novel, and original. 5 In addition, the Service hinted at
the severity with which it intended to apply these new rules by
declaring that mere knowledge or efficiency gained from experi-
ence or skill was not to be considered property, while reiterating
its position that the mere reduction of know-how to documentary
form was not sufficient to afford such material property status."6
Thus, by giving qualifying know-how its narrowest construction,
the Service necessarily broadened its concept of services and lim-
ited the impact of its "ancillary and subsidiary to" exception.
In contrast to the Service's position, the courts' reactions to
know-how transfers have generally reflected a desire to broaden
the scope of those "services" which will qualify as property at
least when the transfer is in some way connected to the transfer
of related patents, secret formulas, or secret processes. 7 From
Ruge through Howard S. Gable," a span of almost twenty years,
the courts have gone through four subtle, and oftentimes indistin-
guishable phases. From Ruge, in 1956, through Revenue Ruling
64-56, the case law and revenue rulings are analyzed solely in
, Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301. On its face Rev. Rul. 64-56 appears to be quite
liberal. There is little in the ruling foreshadowing a restrictive prospective application. See
notes 60-63 and accompanying text supra.
0 Id. at 302. See also notes 14-16, and accompanying text supra and notes 155-171
and accompanying text infra.
11 Id. In addition, the Service restated all of the exclusions formulated in Rev. Rul.
64-56, note 63 supra. Finally, the Service's two new exclusions in subsections .03(b) and
(g) of the Procedure: (1) "The 'information' does not represent mere knowledge, or effi-
ciency resulting from experience, or mere skill in manipulation or total accumulated
experience and skill of the transferor . . . and (2) "Technical information of a related or
similar nature such as new developments in the field will not be furnished on a continuing
basis without adequate compensation .... " could be interpreted as inconsistent with
Rev. Rul. 64-56. For a critical analysis of the Service's retreat in Rev. Proc. 69-19, see 70-
20 TAX MANAGEMENT MEMORANDUM (BNA), 8-11 (Oct. 5, 1970). See also notes 172-179 and
accompanying text infra.
1 For a general discussion of the court's approaches, see J. BISCHELL, supra note 1,
at 6.3a-c; B. BrrrKER AND J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS, 3-13 (3d ed. 1971); Burke, supra note 20, at 747-56 (little doubt that
intangibles constitute property); Cohen, supra note 20, at 38-40 (reference to information
developed for the transferee should be construed strictly); O'Connor, supra note 19, at 757-
58 (cases support a broad definition of property). See notes 68-104 and accompanying text
infra and notes 56-67 supra.
U 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427 (1974).
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terms of the "ancillary and subsidary to" test." From 1962
through approximately 1970, in the face of the Service's contrac-
tion of the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test, a noticeable judicial
shift occurred, not in the flexibility and liberality of the courts'
approach to section 351 know-how transfers, but rather in the
specific language used by the courts to attain that result. Sud-
denly an "incident to" test was espoused to enforce the liberal
standard inaugurated in Ruge, but subsequently misinterpreted
by the Service. 0 From 1970 through 1974, the courts experienced
a transition period, struggling with the apparent deficiencies of
both the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test and the "incident to"
test, when confronted with the issue of transfers of know-how only
indirectly related to recognized forms of property transferred
under section 351.11 Finally, in 1974, the Gable decision marked
the rudimentary beginnings of a final phase. Still reflecting the
judicial liberality with which know-how transfers had been ana-
lyzed since Ruge, Gable formulated a new variation on the
"ancillary and subsidiary to" test: the "related to" test. 2 The
following section of this article will attempt to clarify these nebu-
lous and often overlapping phases by a brief review of the major
cases representing each mode of analysis.
Heil Co., a 1962 Tax Court decision was one of the first
attempts to determine if a transfer of patents and accompanying
know-how could qualify for capital gains treatment. 3 Although
decided prior to the release of Revenue Ruling 64-56, Heil Co. was
decided after the Service announced it was currently reviewing
" Ruge represents the initial formulation of the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test.
There appear to have been no decisions discussing this test until Heil Co., 38 T.C. 989
(1962). By this time, however, the Service had announced it was reviewing the entire area.
Prior to the release of Rev. Rul. 64-56 there was nothing to foreshadow an interpretation
of the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test by the Service other than that endorsed in Ruge.
,0 Beginning with Heil Co., notes 73-78 and accompanying text infra, a clear inconsis-
tency arose between the liberal language of Rev. Rul. 64-56 and the Service's actual
position. Despite the flexibility hinted at in the ruling, the Service in Heil Co., notes 73-
78 infra, Bell Intercontinental Corp., notes 78-79, infra, United States Mineral Products
Co., notes 81-86 infra, and PPG Industries, Inc., notes 89-91 infra, took highly mechanical
and conservative anti-know-how positions. The Service's ruling in Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-1
C.B. 301 epitomized this dramatic contrast.
" By the 1971 decisions, Taylor- Winfield Corp., and Francis H. Shepard, notes 92-
94 infra, there is little if any mention in the opinions of any requisite degree of relationship
between the know-how transferred and the other forms of property transferred.
" 33 T.C.M. at 1433. See notes 93-99 and accompanying text infra.
" 38 T.C. 989 (1962).
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the know-how transfer guidelines.74 The specific technical infor-
mation transferred in Heil Co. consisted of assembly drawings,
customer lists, notes on manufacturing operations, expert assis-
tance, future developments, and research.75 Holding that none of
this information constituted the performance of services, the Tax
Court opined that because the know-how in question was perti-
nent to the successful use of the patents transferred, it took on
the nature of, and was an "incident to", those patents, and there-
fore was entitled to capital gains treatment.76 Despite the differ-
ence in language, the Heil Co. "incident to" test differs little in
result or method of analysis from the Ruge "ancillary and subsidi-
ary to" test." In fact, the two tests as used in Heil Co. seem to
be synonomous. The major advantage of the "incident to" test
however is its expansion of the Ruge test to include past, present,
and even future services.7"
Heil Co. was followed in 1967 by Bell Intercontinental Corp.
v. United States.79 Again, as in Heil Co., the issue was not a
section 351 transfer, but rather whether know-how in conjunction
with certain patents qualified as a capital asset under the general
" See T.I.R. 308, 1961 IRB 13, 21.
" 38 T.C. at 993. In addition, Heil Co. was willing to make its engineers and experts
available for consultation with the transferees employees. Id. at 993-94. All of this infor-
mation related to the development of certain heavy construction machinery.
" Id. at 1003. The court noted that, after reviewing the contract, it was unable to
discover any provisions which provided for the rendering of services by petitioner to the
transferee. Id. at 1002. With respect to future information, the court simply refused to
interfere with the parties' own evaluation of the nature and worth of the rights transferred.
Id. at 1003.
" Compare text accompanyng note 57 with note 75 and accompanying text supra.
" The past services consisted of Heil's own efforts to develop the information; the
present services consisted of consultation with Heil's engineers and experts; and finally,
the future services consisted of any future developments or improvements. Id. at 993-998.
Heil Co. has served as the cornerstone in the development of the concept of know-
how transfers and the issue of whether they constitute property. The Service has issued
guidelines as to what will not be considered "ancillary and subsidiary to" services. See
notes 60-63 and accompanying text supra. In effect Heil foreshadowed a recognition as
property of many of the forms of information subsequently denied property status under
the Service's rulings and procedures. Using the phrase "incident to" rather than "ancillary
and subsidiary to," the court found that engineering and manufacturing assistance, design
improvements, notes on manufacturing operations, and commercial and manufacturing
data were capital assets regardless of their temporal relation, past, present or future, to
the actual transfer. Therefore, the greatest benefit of the "incident to" test was its broad-
ening of the temporal relationship between the actual transfer and earlier or subsequent
service-oriented developments. For further analysis of the "incident to" test, see notes 79-
91 and accompanying text infra.
1' 381 F.2d 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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capital gains sections 1221 and 1222. As in Heil Co., the informa-
tion involved consisted of manufacturing and engineering data,
and the Court of Claims, finding such know-how to constitute a
capital asset, again relied upon the "incident to" test rather than
the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test of Revenue Ruling 64-56.10
Bell, like Heil Co., represents a sharply different attitude toward
the scope of section 351 from that urged by the Service.
In 1969, in United States Mineral Products Co., the Tax
Court reviewed the applicability of the capital gains provisions,
specifically section 1221, to the transfer of manuals, reports, qual-
ity control procedures, tests, data, and other documents to a
wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary." Attempting to reconcile the
widening gap emerging between the interpretation by the Heil
Co. and Bell decisions of the "incident to" test and the Service's
dogged adherence to a very restrictive view of the "ancillary and
subsidiary to" test, the Tax Court noted that because the know-
how in question was unique to and necessary for effective utiliza-
tion of the patents transferred, it was an "incident of" the pat-
ents.8 1 Continuing, the court stated: "Assuming arguendo that
this information was equivalent to consulting services . . . we
find that it was of the type usually called for to implement the
sale of highly technical inventions and, thus, was ancillary and
subsidiary to the assignments of the formulas." 3 It is interesting
to note that the court's use of the "ancillary and subsidiary to"
" Bell executed agreements with Agusta concerning the transfer of certain patents
and production know-how including manufacturing and engineering data for production
of a helicopter. Curiously, in light of the court's reliance upon the "incident to" test, the
court found that the know-how transferred was not dependent upon the patent drawings.
Id. 1019-20. Unfortunately, the court did not identify the specific items constituting the
know-how. Additionally, it is important to note that the court relied exclusively on the
Heil Co. "incident to" test with only an oblique reference to Rev. Rul. 64-56. Id. at 1020.
Clearly, the "incident to" test was seen as a more flexible alternative to the restrictive
interpretation by the Service of Rev. Rul. 64-56's guidelines.
1 52 T.C. 177 (1969). Specifically, petitioner transferred formulas, processes, patents,
manuals containing technical information, consultation with the transferee's employees
as to the use of all information transferred, disclosure of all future inventions and improve-
ments during the term of the agreement, and an agreement to conduct, publish, and
publicize future test results on the products. Id. at 179-80.
" "Without these products a proper application of the ... products would have been
difficult or impossible. This information was an incident of the patents and assumed their
nature as capital assets." Id. at 199. Again as in Bell, note 80 supra, the court refused to




test was more conclusory than analytical. Only after analyzing
the know-how in terms of the "incident to" test did the court feel
any obligation to express its result in language acceptable to the
Service."' Nevertheless, this broadening of the "ancillary and sub-
sidiary to" test by reliance upon the "incident" test was clearly
contrary to the position urged by the Service. 5 Also noteworthy
was the fact that the court cited Ruge and Revenue Ruling 55-
17, rather than Revenue Ruling 64-56, in support of its broad
interpretation of the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test.8"
Subsequent to the decision in Mineral Products Co., the
Service released Revenue Procedure 69-19.11 Although the Proce-
dure made no mention of Mineral Products or its predecessors, it
did break new ground for section 351 transfers of know-how by
providing that: (1) The information must be secret in the strictest
sense of the word; (2) it must represent a discovery that is origi-
'A 52 T.C. at 199.
0 See notes 80 and 82 supra. The information transferred probably ran afoul of Rev.
Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133, because not all of it was secret, it constituted technical assistance
after the start-up phase, and was merely educational in nature. See the discussion of Rev.
Rul. 64-56 and Rev. Proc. 69-19 in notes 60-63 and 64-66 supra, and notes 122-179 and
accompanying text infra.
0 Interestingly, the cited support for the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test was Ar-
thur C. Ruge, 26 T.C. 138 (1956) and Rev. Rul. 17, 1955-1 C.B. 388, not Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-
1 C.B. 133. Without any reference to "ancillary and subsidiary to" services, Rev. Rul. 55-
17 simply ruled:
The right to use such 'know-how' is not materially different from the right
to use . . . secret processes and formulae, and, if the right thereto is granted
as part of a licensing agreement, it becomes, in effect, an integral part of the
bundle of rights acquired ....
The payments made . . . are applicable both to . . . the 'know-how',
and to services performed . . . in instructing and training the employees
... . Since the personal services have only nominal value apart from the
license to use such 'know-how,' all but a nominal sum should be allocated
to the license.
Id. at 389.
Ruge is more directly on point and its initial interpretation and formulation of the
"ancillary and subsidiary to" test is more nearly approximated by the "incident of" test
of Heil Co. and Mineral Products. The Ruge court stated: "The consulting services...
were ancillary and subsidiary . . . to the inventions . . . and are of the type and kind
usually called for to implement the sale of highly technical and intricate inventions." 26
T.C. at 143. One may speculate that the Mineral Products court's reliance on the
"incident to" language represented an attempt to maintain the breadth of the "ancillary
and subsidiary to" test as originally formulated in Ruge but subsequently erroneously
reinterpreted by the Service in Rev. Rul. 64-56. Compare text accompanying note 83 supra
with Ruge, 26 T.C. at 143.
11 Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301.
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nal, unique, and novel; and (3) following from the two require-
ments above, the information may not represent mere knowledge
or efficiency gained from experience or skill."8 Immediately fol-
lowing the release of Revenue Procedure 69-19 the Tax Court
was again faced with the issue of the proper treatment of the
transfer of patents and accompanying know-how, in PPG Indus-
tries, Inc. 9 Referring both to the Service's "ancillary and sub-
sidiary to" test and the "incident to" test, the court recognized
that even after-acquired information may come within the Heil
and Mineral Products Co. "incident to" test for property0 under
section 1211 of the Code. As in Heil Co., the court's use of the
"ancillary and subsidiary to" test in conjunction with the "inci-
dent to" test reflected both an implicit rejection of the Service's
highly mechanical and restrictive interpretation of the Ruge test,
in Revenue Ruling 64-56, and a continued adherence to the more
liberal approach developed in prior decisions."
A major step forward came in the 1971 decision Taylor-
Winfield Corp. where, without citation of any past case law, the
court simply asserted that it was "settled" that the transfer of
unpatented technology, such as know-how, could be the subject
of a sale, and that technical data should be treated, for section
I Id. at 302. See the brief discussion of the Procedure in note 66 supra. For a de-
tailed discussion of Rev. Proc. 69-19 see generally Burke, supra note 20, at 755; Flyer and
Buell, supra note 4, at 27-28; TAX MANAGEMENT MEMORANDUM, supra note 66. Though the
Procedure does not expressly so state, many of its new prohibitions strike directly at the
developments in Heil Co., Bell Intercontinental Corp., and Mineral Products. See notes
73-85 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 122-179 and accompanying text infra.
9 55 T.C. 928 (1970). The assets transferred to the corporation consisted of patents,
trade secrets, research and development data, technical information and know-how, in-
cluding engineering, scientific and practical information and formulae, manufacturing
data and procedures, machinery, plant and equipment designs, information or materials
and commercial sources thereof, technical information in reports and drawings, blue-
prints, and specifications, along with all such future information coming into the posses-
sion of the transferor during the term of the agreement. Id. at 975, 977, 979-80, 983.
" The court cited with approval the applicability of the Heil Co. "incident to" test
even for information conveyed after the date of the agreement. Id. at 1015-16. Referring
to Heil Co. and Mineral Products, the court referred to the "ancillary and subsidiary to"
test but clearly applied something more akin to the earlier discussed "incident to" test.
Interestingly, the court found that the materials in question implemented the patented
and unpatented information transferred, and made possible the effective utilization of
such technology. The court reasoned therefore that the materials were "ancillary and
subsidiary." Id. at 1018. In PPG, the court used the more liberal test to find that certain
know-how constituted property but relied upon the more restrictive test to phrase its
conclusions.
9" See notes 73-78 and 80 and accompanying text supra.
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1235 capital gains purposes, in a manner similar to patents.2
Again, the nature of the know-how transferred was similar to that
transferred in the earlier discussed decisions and probably came
within the prohibitions of Revenue Procedure 69-19. 13 Interest-
ingly, no mention was made of the procedure. Tempering the
broad language employed by the court, however, was the fact that
in conjunction with the transfer of know-how, Taylor-Winfield
did transfer certain patents and processes. Addressing the
"transfer" issue, the court emphasized that the value of these
patents was not insignificant. 4
The most recent Tax Court examination of the know-how
issue occurred in 1974, in Howard S. Gable. Citing all of the
earlier discussed opinions, the court, in an ambiguously worded
opinion, advanced a new "related to" test and interpreted it very
liberally." Addressing an issue often avoided in the past, the
court noted that underlying any patent transfer is a transfer of
knowledge, knowledge a transferee is likely to require to imple-
-2 57 T.C. 205, 213 (1971). The specific information transferred consisted of engineer-
ing data, designs, research, developments, drawings, layouts, reports and any future de-
velopments and patents. Id. at 207.
It is interesting to note that by disregarding the patents transferred, and looking at
the know-how in isolation, Taylor- Winfield recognized that technical data is to be treated
similarly to patents. Id. Conspicuously missing in the opinion is any reference to a requi-
site relationship between patented and unpatented materials transferred. Id. at 217.
'1 Compare notes 57, 75, 80, 81 and 89 and accompanying text with notes 63-66 and
accompanying text supra.
"1 57 T.C. at 217.
Taylor-Winfield was followed by Francis H. Shepard, 57 T.C. 600 (1972), rev'd 481
F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1973) (Unpublished Opinion), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974). In
Shepard the lower court examined the transfer in question and found that the payments
made were only in consideration for certain technical information including drawings,
designs, and blueprints. The lower court accorded this technical information capital asset
treatment. Id. at 609-615. It is difficut to ascertain whether the decision was reversed on
this ground. In contrast to all the cases prior to Shepard, including Taylor- Winfield,
Shepard was the first to favorably address technical information in gross, although the
court was careful to note that all of the information transferred related to a patented
invention covered in the original agreement but never actually transferred to the trans-
feree. Id. at 612-615. The precedential value of Shepard however is highly questionable in
light of its unexplained reversal.
- 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427 (1974).
" Id. at 1433. The court formulated a test even more flexible and liberal than the
"incident to" test. The court held: "The rule is to be applied to exempt from treatment
as services not only the communication of existing know-how, but the development of
further information as long as it relates to the property transferred and constitutes assis-
tance rendered in connection with the transfer." (Emphasis added.) Id.
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ment and develop the property transferred. 7 Recognizing the ne-
cessity of this know-how to the value of the property transferred,
and distinguishing services specifically related to an invention
from services meant only to advance the transferee's business in
a general sense, the court afforded property status to that infor-
mation "related to" the property transferred. 8 In summary,
Gable must be viewed with caution because of the extremely
imprecise language employed by the court. Nevertheless, the
"related to" test perhaps marks the beginning of a broader ap-
proach to know-how transfers that may be sufficiently flexible to
encompass even transfers of know-how in gross.9
In retrospect, the post-1964 know-how decisions reveal a ju-
dicial willingness to stretch the language of Revenue Ruling 64-
56 to its broadest and most liberal limits, and to ignore the more
conservative gloss put on the ruling by the Service in Revenue
Procedure 69-19.100 The decisions have evidenced an increasing
liberality toward section 351 transfers of know-how. From Heil
Co., in which the touchstone test focused on the degree of depend-
ence of the know-how transferred upon the other property in the
transaction, the Tax Court has progressed and broadened its
analysis by means of the "related to" test. In effect, Gable may
foreshadow an analytical framework focusing not predominantly
on the property aspects of the transferred patents alone, but
rather on the independent property status of each of the rights
transferred, both patents and know-how.''
'7 Id.
a The specific information transferred by Gable consisted of inventions, compounds,
processes, improvements thereon, technical information, patents, and an agreement to
continue further work, development, and experiments. Id. at 1429. The court termed the
"essence of the transaction" the sale of a patent, and the performance of any services only
a step in developing the property transferred. Id. at 1432.
N See note 101 and accompanying text infra.
15 To date, the courts have simply ignored Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301.
'' In Heil, discussion in notes 73-78 and accompanying text supra, the very nature
of the "incident to" test required a two-step analysis. First the court examined the trans-
action to determine if property has been transferred. Only after answering the first ques-
tion in the affirmative did the court address the second issue, that is, whether any non-
property assets (i.e., know-how) in and of themselves, are incidental to the successful
utilization of the property transferred. This pattern repeats itself in Bell, Mineral
Products, and PPG Industries, discussed at notes 78-79, 81-86 and 89-91 and accompany-
ing text supra.
A subtle shift in language and focus occurred in Taylor- Winfield, 57 T.C. 205 (1971)
and the lower court decision in Francis H. Shepard, 57 T.C. 600 (1972) rev'd, 481 F.2d
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Certainly this method of analysis is at odds with the restric-
tive reformation of the Service's position found in the most
recent revenue rulings and procedures. 0 2 Perhaps the best exam-
ple of the ever-widening divergence of the Tax Court decisions
and the Service's published position may be seen in the area of
transfers of future services. In Gable, the court noted that earlier
decisions had recognized that the development of further infor-
mation for the transferee by the transferor, as long as it "related
to" the earlier transferred property, was still exempt from treat-
ment as services under section 351.'"3 Although an accurate state-
ment of prior case law, this statement is totally contrary to the
Service's position as expressed in both Revenue Ruling 64-56 and
Revenue Procedure 69-19: Technical information of a related or
similar nature such as new developments in the field may not be
furnished on a continuing basis to the transferee without ade-
quate compensation (in other words, ordinary income treat-
ment). 104 Admitting this is only one of many examples of the
conflict between the Service's guidelines and the case law devel-
1399 (3d Cir. 1973) (Unpublished Opinion), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974) (stating that
unpatented technology by itself could be the subject of a sale and that "technical data"
should be treated for tax purposes similarly to patents.) Interestingly, the information
involved in Taylor- Winfield was not an incident of a patent, but only related to unpa-
tented items. See note 92 supra. In Shepard, a patent, involved in the license agreement,
was never transferred. See note 94 supra.
By 1974, the court had come full circle. In Gable, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427 (1974), by
recognizing that in any transfer of technical information and know-how, knowledge consti-
tutes a large part of the transfer, the court implicitly shifted its perspective to recognize
that know-how itself is deserving of property status coequal with that of patents. A trans-
fer of technical information is more than simply a separate transfer of patents and depen-
dent know-how in the same agreement; the transfer is one of interrelated and interdepen-
dent coequal property components; in effect, the transfer is a package of property assets.
Consequently, the "related to" test removes the stigma of dependence or market inferior-
ity attached to know-how by the "incident to" or "ancillary and subsidiary to" tests, and
in its place recognizes the distinct and separate property aspect of know-how in and of
itself. To support this analysis, see Flyer and Buell, supra note 19, at 26, 29.
1' See notes 24, 60-66 supra.
'1 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1433. In Heil Co., 38 T.C. at 993-94, the Tax Court included
as property the furnishing of future consultation services relating to the inventions trans-
ferred. See notes 75-78 supra. Similar treatment was given an agreement for future con-
sultation, and future developments and improvements in Mineral Products, 52 T.C. at
199. See notes 81-86 supra. See also Shepard, 57 T.C. at 605, rev'd, 481 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir.
1973) (Unpublished Opinion), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974) (future inventions and
improvements); Taylor- Winfield, 57 T.C. at 209 (future developments and improve-
ments); PPG, Inc., 55 T.C. at 1015 (future services and the Heil Co. decision).
'" Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301. See also notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra,
and notes 172-179 and accompanying text infra.
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opments, it is perhaps the most dramatic example of the near
total rejection by the courts of the Service's unfounded and arbi-
trary distinction between services and property for purposes of
section 351.
II. KNOW-HOW IN GROSS: PROPERTY AS DEFINED BY FEDERAL LAW
The tax decisions discussed in the preceding section indicate
that anything which by law constitutes property, should also rep-
resent property for purposes of section 351. In E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. United States, the Court of Claims defined
property as "that commonly thought of in the business world as
a positive business asset."° 5 DuPont was followed four years later
by Stafford v. United States in which the Middle District Court
of Georgia broadened the DuPont property definition to include
any real or personal, tangible or intangible property, or any asset
which the owner has a right to possess, own or dispose of.0 Ad-
mittedly, property may not, and probably should not, be defined
so broadly as to include anything which may represent a benefit
to the parties, a definition foreshadowed by the broad dicta in
Stafford.°7 However, at a minimum, property for purposes of sec-
tion 351 should encompass everything which is generally recog-
nized as a legally protected interest; the specific holdings in
DuPont and Stafford mandate no less.
The "legally protected interest" construction of the term
"property" provides the taxpayer with an arsenal of weapons with
which to attack the only restrictive pronouncements of the Serv-
ice. The vast majority of states define legally protected informa-
tion in terms of the Restatement of Torts, section 757, defining
"trade secret": A trade secret may consist of any formula, pat-
tern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advan-
tage over competitors who do not know or use it. ' As will be
noted below, recent nontax federal cases have also endorsed this
definition of legally protected information. Since the broad con-
cepts of "property" expressed in DuPont and Stafford must at
' 471 F.2d at 1218. See the discussion in notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
' 435 F. Supp. at 1038. See the discussion in note 39 and accompanying text supra.
,0 435 F. Supp. at 1038-39.
"" RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 757, comment b (1939) See generally Klein, The Techni-
cal Trade Secret Quadrangle: A Survey 55 Nw. UL. Rv. 437 (1960).
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least encompass legally protected interests and since federal
courts define legally protected information in terms of the widely
employed Restatement of Torts definition of "trade secret,"
must not this definition also be binding on the Service for the
purpose of determining qualifying know-how transfers under
section 351? In this fashion, the Restatement can be employed
to provide clear guidelines to the taxpayer as to what forms of
know-how will and should be granted property status. The analy-
sis which follows attempts to outline the specific instances
where, contrary to the Service's pronouncements, know-how
transfers should qualify as property for the purpose of section
351.
At one time serious questions existed as to whether any non-
patented intellectual property could be protected by the states.
Arguments were made that Lear, Inc. v. Adkins'"' stood as a
precedent for the rule that federal patent law preempted state
trade secret law."10 This controversy was put to rest by the Su-
preme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp."'
10, Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
"I In Lear the Court expressly refused to rule on the issue of whether royalties legally
could be collected for the license of a trade secret. The Court, however, intimated that its
ruling with respect to licensee estoppel might cast a broader shadow on trade secret law:
"Our decision today will, of course, require the state courts to reconsider the theoretical
basis of their decisions enforcing the contractual rights of inventors and it is impossible
to predict the extent to which this re-evaluation may revolutionize the law of any particu-
lar State in this regard." Id. at 675.
Viewed in terms of such earlier decisions as Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), many
commentators expressed doubt as to whether state protection of trade secrets could sur-
vive a challenge based upon preemption by the federal patent laws. Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Painton & Co. v.
Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971); Adel-
man & Jaress, Inventions and the Law of Trade Secrets After Lear v. Adkins, 16 WAYNE
L. REv. 77 (1969); Arnold and Goldstein, Life Under Lear, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 1235 (1970);
Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 17
(1971); Note, Federal Preemption of State Trade Secret Law: Existing Theories and a
Proposed Solution, 24 CAsE W. REs. L. Rv. 799 (1973); Note, The Viability of Trade
Secret Protection After Lear v. Adkins, 16 V1L.. L. REv. 551 (1971). Doerfer, The Limits
on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 1432 (1967). See Hawkland, Some Recent American Developments in the Protection
of Know-How, 20 BuFF. L. REV. 119 (1970). See also Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret
Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1432 (1967);
Note, The Scott Amendment to the Patent Revision Act: Should Trade Secrets Receive
Federal Protection, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 900.
" 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
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The Kewanee Court made two important determinations: (1)
that states had the power to protect intellectual property,"2 and
(2) that specific state protections, at least when in conformity
with the Restatement of Torts definition of trade secret, did not
conflict with the federal patent laws."3 The Court reasoned that
federal patent protection and the Restatement's protection of
trade secrets were complementary, serving the same purpose of
promoting business invention and efficiency."' As a result, state
protection of trade secrets, as enunciated by the Restatement, is
not only permissible but desirable."5 In other words, compilations
of information meeting the standards of the Restatement can and
should represent a legally protected interest. Viewed in terms of
the Hempt Bros. and Stafford cases, which state that any rights
"1 416 U.S. at 478-79. See Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122, 132 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1056 (1975); Richter v. Westab, Inc., 529 F.2d 896, 901 (6th Cir. 1976);
Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 358 N.E.2d 804 (Mass. 1976).
" 416 U.S. at 491. See Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
See the following commentaries for discussions of the Kewanee holdings: Stern, A
Reexamination of Preemption of State Trade Secret Law after Kewanee, 42 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 927 (1974); Note, Survival of State Protection for Trade Secrets, 28 ARK. L. REV.
491 (1975); Note, Trade Secrets: Federal Patent Law Does Not Preempt State Laws
Protecting Trade Secrets Which, Although Appropriate Subjects for Patent Protection,
Are Ineligible for Patent Protection Because They Have Been in Public Use for More Than
One Year, 41 BROOK. L. REv. 682 (1975); Note, State Trade Secret Protection is not
Preempted by Operation of United States Patent Law, 12 Hous. L. REV. 191 (1974); Note,
Constitutional Law-Patents and Trade Secrets-Federal Patent Law Does Not Preempt
State Trade Secret Law, 51 N.D. L. REy. 212 (1974); Note, Trade Secrets - Federal Patent
Code Does Not Preempt State Trade Secret Statutes, 28 RuT. L. REV. 191 (1974); Note,
Constitutional Law -Patent Clause - Status May Afford Trade Secret Protection Without
Infringing Upon Federal Patent Power, 20 VtLL. L. REv. 225 (1974); Note, Accommodation
of Federal Patent and the State Interest in Trade Secrets, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 171
(1974); Note, Patent Law - No Federal Preemption of State Trade Secret Law, 1974 Wis.
L. REv. 1195.
"I "Trade secret law will encourage invention in areas where patent law does not
reach, and will prompt the independent inventor to proceed with the discovery and exploi-
tation of his invention. Competition is fostered and the public is not deprived of the use
of valuable, if not quite patentable, inventions." 416 U.S. at 485
"' The Court discusses the need for state trade secret protection as follows:
Trade secret law encourages the development and exploitation of those items
of lesser or different invention than might be accorded protection under the
patent laws, but which items still have an important part to play in the
technological and scientific advancement of the Nation. Trade secret law
promotes the sharing of knowledge, and the efficient operation of industry
... .Congress, by its silence over these many years, has seen the wisdom
of allowing the States to enforce trade secret protection.
416 U.S. at 493.
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which can be possessed, used, or transferred represent property,
Kewanee's endorsement of trade secret protection in general, and
the Restatement in particular, should serve to establish mini-
mum guidelines with respect to what forms of secret information
transfers will be granted nonrecognition status under section
351(a).
Indeed, subsequent decisions have cited Kewanee for the rule
that the Restatement represents the federal definition of a pro-
tected trade secret. Faced with the task of construing "trade
secret" for the purpose of the Freedom of Information Act, the
Ninth Circuit relied on Kewanee's reference to the Restatement:
"The Supreme Court has defined 'trade secret' as it applies to
the patent laws as a 'compilation of information' which is used
in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.""' In
another case addressing the scope of the Freedom of Information
Act, the District Court for the District of Columbia, quoting from
Kewanee, stated that the court "must make a threshold determi-
nation whether such materials fall within the 'widely relied-upon
definition of trade secret found at 4 Restatement of Torts § 757,
comment b (1939).' ""7 Similarly, in those instances where the
court has not specifically addressed local law,"'8 or where local law
is in doubt,"9 the Restatement inevitably emerges as the standard
the court applies in defining what constitutes a protected trade
secret. These post-Kewanee decisions, by specifically adopting
the Restatement's definition of protected information for the pur-
"' Union Oil Co. of Calif. v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1976). See Rel-Reeves,
Inc. v. United States, 534 F.2d 274, 297 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (citing both the Restatement of
Torts and Kewanee for what is protectable as a trade secret property right under an armed
service procurement regulation defining "proprietary data"); Truck Equipment Service
Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, (In a case involv-
ing unfair competition under the Lanham Act, the court cited Kewanee for the proposition
that those who invest time and money in the development of goodwill should reap the
benefits of their energy); Pharmaceutical Man. Ass'n v. Weinburger, 411 F. Supp. 576,
580 (D.D.C. 1976) (assessing the propriety of a FDA regulation by comparing it to the
Restatement of Torts definition of trade secret).
'" Ashland Oil Inc. v. FTC, 409 F. Supp. 297, 303 (D.D.C.), aff'd 548 F.2d 977 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
" Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 303 (2d Cir. 1975); Telex Corp. v.
I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Kodeky Elecs.,
Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 486 F. 2d 449 (10th Cir. 1973).
"I Tri-Tron Int'l v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1975); Keystone Plastics, Inc.
v. C&P Plastics, Inc., 506 F.2d 960, 964 (5th Cir. 1975); K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., Inc.,
506 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1974).
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poses of federal law, reinforce the conclusion that Kewanee re-
quires that the Service recognize the Restatement standards of
what information represents property. Kewanee's endorsement of
the Restatement, when construed together with the broad defini-
tion of property in DuPont and Stafford must therefore bind the
Service to the Restatement's definition of protected information
for purposes of section 351. As demonstrated in Part II, there has
been little controversy over whether secret formulas or secret pat-
terns and devices (i.e. secret processes) are recognized as prop-
erty. Similarly, cases interpreting section 351 seem to hold that
virtually any valuable compilation of information will also qual-
ify as property when the information transfer is an "incident of"
the transfer of patents, secret formulas, or secret processes. The
unanswered question is what forms of know-how, independent of
any patents or trade secrets, will qualify as property. By applying
the Restatement to section 351 this question is answered as well.
To illustrate the impact of the Restatement, the analysis
which follows highlights those specific positions taken by the
Service which cannot withstand judicial attack when judged
against the Restatement. Specifically, the authors will address
two fundamental tests which the Service apparently requires that
the taxpayer meet before a know-how transfer will be granted
nonrecognition status under sections 351 and 367: (1) The infor-
mation must be absolutely secret, that is, known only to the
owner and employees who use it; and (2) in addition to being a
discovery, the information must be original, unique and novel.
Admittedly these tests apply only to the limited issue of whether
a transfer will be granted prior approval under the now obsolete
advance notice rules of section 367.10 In light of the Tax Reform
Act's recent adoption of a post-transfer review procedure, the
standards expressed in Revenue Procedure 69-19 may no longer
necessarily reflect the Service's position with respect to what
forms of know-how will qualify under section 351. However, since
the requirements articulated in the Revenue Procedure appear to
be designed to supplement the ambiguous rules expressed in Rev-
enue Ruling 64-56, the Revenue Procedure must substantially
reflect the Service's position with respect to section 351 as well.
"2 See note 3 supra for the changes in section 367 implemented by the Tax Reform
Act of 1976.
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Indeed a careful reading of the Procedure commands this conclu-
sion.'2 '
The authors will demonstrate how neither the "absolute se-
cret" nor the "unique and novel" tests can stand as appropriate
guidelines for what should constitute property under section
351(a) when compared against the Restatement. Having reached
this conclusion, the authors will further highlight how other more
specific positions taken by the Service with respect to know-how
also must give way in the face of contrary legal authority.
A. Must the Information Be Absolutely Secret?
Although Revenue Ruling 64-56 requires information to be
secret before it will be granted property status,'2 it was not until
Revenue Procedure 69-19 was issued that the Service stated what
it meant by "secret." First, "adequate safeguards" must have
been taken "to guard the secret against unauthorized disclo-
sure."' 23 This demand for adequate safeguards presumably does
not differ materially from the common law requirement that the
owner take "reasonable" precautions under the circumstances to
protect his secret.' 2 However, the Service's second requirement
"I The Revenue Procedure demands that the taxpayer represent that the information
is property under section 351 as defined by Revenue Ruling 64-56, and that the informa-
tion is protected under U. S. law, the law of the transferor. The Procedure then states:
"In making such representations the taxpayer should ... state" that the information is
absolutely secret and that it is original, unique, and novel. 1969-2 C.B. at 302. Since "such
representations" must refer to the property and protection requirements, one must neces-
sarily assume that the dual tests which follow represent the Service's interpretation of
governing U.S. law.
I" In Revenue Ruling 64-56 the Service stated that property consists of secret pro-
cesses, secret formulas, and secret information "in the general nature of a patentable
invention . . . . Other information which is secret will be given consideration as 'property'
on a case-by-case basis." 1964-1 (Part 1) C.B. at 134.
'2 1969-2 C.B. at 302.
,2 R. Mn.zm, supra note 7, § 2.04 at 2-26 to 2-27 (1977); See, e.g., K-2 Ski Co. v.
Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471. 474 (9th Cir. 1974); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v.
Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Allen
Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 145 Conn. 509, 144 A.2d 306, 310 (1958); Space Aero Prods. Co., Inc.,
v. R. E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965); Sun Dial
Corp. v. Rideout, 16 N.J. 252, 108 A.2d 442 (1954); General Analine & Film Corp. v.
Frantz, 50 Misc.2d 994, 272 N.Y.S.2d 600, 606, judgment modified, 52 Misc.2d 197, 274
N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
The Restatement of Torts mentions "the extent of measures taken by him to guard
the secrecy of the information" and "the extent to which it is known by employees and
others involved in his business" as two of the six factors to consider in evaluating whether
a trade secret exists. RESTATEMENT op TORTS § 757 at 6. Significantly the Supreme Court
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that the information be "known only by the owner and those
confidential employees who require the 'information' for use in
the conduct of the activities to which it is related ... " de-
viates substantially from the standards expressed in the Restate-
ment. This "absolute" view 2" of secrecy can derive only from the
Service's fundamental misinterpretation of the proprietary inter-
ests embodied in a trade secret, in general, and know-how, in
particular.
The Service has attempted to impose upon trade secrets and
know-how tests appropriate only for patents."7 Patent rights and
trade secret rights are fundamentally different concepts requiring
fundamentally different rules of analysis. A patent is a grant of
an absolute monopoly. The invention is a secret until a patent
application is approved, whereupon the invention is publicly dis-
closed. In exchange for disclosure, the Government grants the
inventor a monopoly in the invention, limited to a seventeen-year
term. 28 The patentee's monopoly includes the right to prevent
independent creation and use of the invention. 9
A trade secret is information of sufficient competitive value
so that one who does not know the information cannot appropri-
ate the information to himself or another in breach of a confid-
ence. It involves an obligation of fair dealing, implied from the
very value of the information itself or created by express con-
tract.' 31 Unlike a patent, the owner has no right to prevent one
who independently discovers such information from using it; the
in Kewanee stated that one of the disadvantages that would result from denying trade
secret protection would be excessive security measures. 416 U.S. at 486.
12 1969-2 C.B. at 302.
' Those few authorities stating the "absolute" view that a secret can be known only
by the owner and employees with a need to know generally do so gratuitously. In other
words, it is rare, if ever, that a court will employ the absolute secrecy doctrine as a rule
of decision in a case. See R. MiLGRM § 2.07[2] at 2-75 to 2-76 & n. 11.
"' See also the discussion of the Service's novelty requirement at text accompanying
notes 155-159 infra.
'1 416 U.S. at 481. Contrast rights in a trade secret which survive as long as the
information remains secret. American Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F.2d
446 (6th Cir. 1942).
' Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 416 U.S. 470, 478 (1974).
'° In essence a trade secret action is one for "inequitable competition arising from a
breach of trust." Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 387, 67 A. 339,
343 (1907) (granting trade secret protection despite the fact that the secret had been stolen
before). See also Nash, The Concept of 'Property' in Know-how as a Growing Area of




owner's rights therefore are not exclusive.' The owner does, how-
ever, have the right to prevent another from appropriating infor-
mation discovered and developed by the owner's efforts. Having
expended time and money to make a discovery, the owner has the
right to force competitors to make the same investment of their
own time and money. 132 The owner retains his right until that
point in time when the information becomes generally known.'
Since a trade secret action is essentially an action for misap-
propriation, a requirement of absolute secrecy is irrelevant in
defining the trade secret right. The protective rights derive from
the competitive value of the information. It does not matter if
only the owner and a minimum number of employees know the
secret. Rather what matters is whether knowledge of the secret is
sufficiently limited so that one who does not know the informa-
tion cannot equitably appropriate it from one who does know it.'
"I "A trade secret law, however, does not offer protection against discovery by free
and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidential disclosure, or by so-
called reverse engineering .. " Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476
(1974). Rather the holder of a trade secret is protected against someone acquiring the
knowledge by "improper" means. Id. Thus the proprietary right under a trade secret is
not an exclusive property right in the information, but rather the right to protect one's
information from improper appropriation. RESTATEMENT OF ToRs § 757 at 4. Droeger v.
Welsh Sporting Goods Corp., 541 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1976); Frances H. Shepard, Jr.,
57 T.C. 600, 614 (1972), rev'd 481 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974);
Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 101, 67 N.E.2d 667, 670 (1946).
"S' The Kewanee Court quoted language from the leading case of A.O. Smith Corp.
v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 1934), modified 74 F.2d 934 (1935)
which noted the function of trade secret law to protect one who makes a discovery, even
if nonpatentable, from the competitive injury resulting from a "competitor who by unfair
means, or as the beneficiary of a broken faith, obtains the desired knowledge without
himself paying the price in labor, money, or mechanics expended by the discoverer." 416
U.S. at 482. This statement repeats a view expressed by the Supreme Court some seventy
years before: "The plaintiff has the right to keep the work which it has done, or paid for
doing, to itself. The fact that others might do similar work, if they might, does not
authorize them to steal the plaintiff's." Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock
Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250 (1905).
" As long as information is substantially secret it will support an action for misap-
propriation, See text accompanying note 139 infra. However, once information becomes
a matter of general or public knowledge it cannot be a trade secret and any rights to
protection are lost. RESTATEMENT OF TorS § 757, at 5-6. 416 U.S. at 475.
I' Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974). Servo Corp. of Am. v.
General Elec. Co., 393 F.2d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 1968). "It is the employment of improper
means to procure the trade secret, rather than the mere copying or use, which is the basis
of the liability under the rule stated in this section." RESTATEMENT OF ToRrs § 757 at 3-4.
See E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917); E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904,910 (Ct. Cl. 1961); International
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Consequently the Restatement expresses the broader major-
ity rule of relative secrecy:'35
It is not requisite that only the proprietor of the business know it.
He may, without losing his protection, communicate it to employees
involved in its use. He may likewise communicate it to others
pledged to secrecy. Others may also know of it independently, as,
for example when they have discovered the process and formula by
independent invention and are keeping it secret.'"
In other words, contrary to the Service's stance in Revenue Proce-
dure 69-19, the mere fact that an owner has licensed his secret to
others,"7 or that others have independently discovered the se-
cret, 3 8 does not destroy the owner's proprietary interest in pre-
venting unauthorized disclosure or use of his secret. All that is
required is that "a substantial element of secrecy . . .exist, so
that, except by the use of improper means, there would be diffi-
culty in acquiring the information."'39
Admittedly, certain disclosures will destroy the element of
Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907, 913 (D. Del. 1951) aff'd 248 F.2d
696 (3d Cir 1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958); Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 145
Conn. 509, 144 A.2d 306, 309 (1958).
I" See, e.g., Tri-Tron Int'l v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1975); K-2 Ski Co. v.
Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1974); A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Products
Co., 389 F.2d 11, 16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968); Republic Sys. & Program-
ming, Inc. v. Computer Assistance, Inc., 322 F.Supp. 619 (D. Conn. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d
996 (2d Cir. 1971); Cudahy Co. v. American Labs. Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1339, 1343-44 (D.
Neb. 1970); Plastic & Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Roy, 163 Conn. 257, 303 A.2d 725 (1972);
Town & Country House & Home Serv. Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314, 317-18, 189 A.2d 390,
393 (1963); Henkle & Joyce Hardware Co. v. Maco, Inc., 195 Neb. 565, 571, 239 N.W.2d
772, 776 (1976); R. Mn~iuM, supra note 7, § 2.07[2].
"' RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, at 6.
"' Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974); Chicago Bd. of Trade
v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250-51 (1904).
"' The mere fact that others have obtained the information does not defeat its status
as a trade secret. Thus one early opinion states:
A "secret" is nothing more than a private matter; something known only to
one or a few and kept from others. It may be acquired by lawful means, ...
without tracing title to the originator, and when so acquired it does not
necessarily cease to be a secret which may be protected from unlawful com-
petition. Secrecy may be absolute or relative.
Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1, 138 N.E. 485,487 (1923). See McKinzie
v. Cline, 197 Or. 184, 252 P.2d 564, 567-68 (1953).
I" K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1974); A.H. Emery
Co. v. Marcan Prods. Co., 389 F.2d 11, 16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968); Basic
Chems. Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220, 229 (Ia. 1977); Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R.E.
Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 109-10, 208 A.2d 74, 82, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965); Sun
Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 16 N.J. 252, 257, 108 A.2d 442, 445 (1954).
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substantial secrecy required by the Restatement. In some instan-
ces, the public distribution and sale of a product will eliminate
any trade secret claimed in its design.' The publication of a
patent will also destroy the required element of secrecy."' Simi-
larly, publication in trade magazines or the general availability
of the information may destroy the secret."
2
However, disclosure in and of itself will not preclude protec-
tion of a trade secret unless that disclosure renders "meaningless"
the duty to maintain such information in confidence."' At bot-
tom, the issue is whether the information remains secret to the
"4 Koehring Co. v. E.D. Etnyre & Co., 254 F. Supp. 334, 361 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Houser
v. Snap-On Tools Corp. 202 F. Supp. 181, 187 (D. Md. 1962); Speciner v. Reynolds Metal
Co., 177 F. Supp. 291, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1960); Bimbo Mfg.
Co. v. Starz Cylinder Co., 119 Ill. App. 2d 251, 256 N.E.2d 357, 364 (1969). See Skoog v.
McCray Refrigerator Co., 211 F.2d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1954) (public display of innovation).
But this result follows only when the claimed secret can be easily discovered from inspec-
tion of the product. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 374 (7th Cir. 1953). Thus, Dravo
in finding a trade secret commented: "Here was no simple device, widely circulated, the
construction of which was ascertainable at a glance." Id. at 375. See Kubik Inc. v. Hull,
56 Mich. App. 335, 224 N.W.2d 80, 93 (1974); K & G Tool & Service Co. v. G & G Fishing
Magnets, Inc., 58 Tex. 594, 314 S.W.2d 782, 787, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958).
141 Once a patent is granted, all the details of the invention are published and secrecy
is lost. Thus a trade secret action cannot be maintained for appropriations after that date.
Scharmer v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 525 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1975). However, if the secret is
appropriated before the patent is published, even though the patent is later published,
most courts will nonetheless continue to recognize the trade secret action. See, e.g., Engel-
hard Indus., Inc. v. Research Instrumental Corp., 324 F.2d 347, 352 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964); Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th
Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1937); Julius Hyman & Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 123
Colo. 563, 233 P.2d 977 (1951); Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp., 18 N.J.
467, 114 A.2d 438 (1955); Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958).
" Pressure Science Inc. v. Kramer, 413 F. Supp. 618, 626 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 537
F.2d 301 (1977), affd 551 F.2d 301; Ferranti Electric "Inc. v. Harwood, 43 Misc. 2d 533,
251 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1964). But the disclosure must destroy the value of the secret. Pressed
Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 A. 4, 9 (1904); A.H. Emery Co.
v. Marcan Prods. Co., 388 F.2d 11, 16 (2d Cir. 1968). "Absolute secrecy is not essential
and the plaintiff does not abandon his secret by delivering it or a copy to another for a
restrictive purpose, nor by a limited publication." Plastic & Metal Fabricators, Inc. v.
Roy, 163 Conn. 257, 303 A.2d 725, 731 (1972).
"4' Servo Corp. of America v. General Electric Corp., 393 F.2d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 1968);
Wilkes v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 (D.S.C. 1974).
The fact that one secret can be discovered more easily than another does
not affect the principle. Even if resort to the patterns of the plaintiff was
more of a convenience than a necessity, still, if there was a secret, it belonged
to him, and the defendant had no right to obtain it by unfair means, or to
use it after it was thus obtained.
Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (1889).
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extent that it retains a competitive value. Information may have
been discovered by others, or disclosed to others; yet despite this
"publication" the information may continue to provide the
"possessor a commercial advantage over his competitors. This
advantage constitutes value, and the disclosure of the informa-
tion which creates the advantage may be sufficient to raise the
implied agreement not to appropriate it."'"
The possessor's competitive advantage derives principally
from the effort that a competitor would have to expend in order
to obtain the same knowledge.'" Thus, in assessing the impact of
disclosure on the viability of a secret, the proper question is not
whether the disclosure makes the secret discoverable, but rather,
whether an effort is still required in order to discover the secret.
As a result, in evaluating a trade secret it is not determinative
that one could develop or deduce the secret by examining pub-
lished materials'" or through one's own experimentation."7 Nei-
' Kamin v. Kuhnau, 233 Or. 139, 374 P.2d 912, 917 (1962).
,, "[Tlhe mere fact that [a means of] lawful acquisition is available does not mean
that he may, through a breach of confidence, gain the information in usable form and
escape the efforts of inspection and analysis." Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375
(7th Cir. 1953). Similarly, in holding that know-how reduced to blueprints constituted a
trade secret, one court states: "To be secret means that a blueprint, for example, is not
in the public domain through divulgence and that it is not too easily discoverable; that
is, apparent to all without too much hard work." Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 50 Ill.
App. 2d 402, 200 N.E.2d 615, 618 (1964). See Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 367 F. Supp.
258 (N.Dj. Okla. 1973), modified, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 802
(1975); see also Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 342
F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 1965).
"I "It matters not that defendants could have gained their knowledge from a study
of the expired patent and plaintiffs' publicly marketed product. The fact is that they did
not. Instead they gained it from plaintiffs via their confidential relationship and in so
doing incurred a duty not to use it to plaintiffs' detriment." Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d
493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953).
In Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. Wiley Mfg. Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Md. 1969) the
court found that a trade secret existed despite the fact that one could have discovered the
secret "by expending a considerable amount of time in the inspection of Ellicott dredges
and by searching catalogues and brochures issued over a period of years by various sup-
pliers." Where a combination of information is not itself a matter of public knowledge,
the fact that one can piece together the knowledge through the disclosed pieces does not
destroy the trade secret. Id. at 1052-53. See note 145 supra and accompanying text; Franke
v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953).
"I International Indus. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907, 913 (D. Del.
1951), aff'd, 248 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958); Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 671, 192 N.Y.S.2d 102, 119




ther will the mere marketing of a product destroy the underlying
trade secret if one must "reverse engineer" in order to discover
that product. 4 ' Similarly, it is no defense in a misappropriation
action to assert that "the information embraced in each secret
could have been discovered by diligent research or could have
been ascertained by restoring to sources which the defendant
never explored, such as testimony in prior litigation or the exami-
nation of expired patents, or by resorting to an article in a trade
magazine. .... ,,9 In other words, by affording protection to all
information which provides a competitive advantage, the Re-
statement ignores the issue of who knows or could know the infor-
mation. Rather, the crucial issue becomes who does not know the
"secret." If enough people remain in ignorance so that the infor-
mation retains competitive value the information will be pro-
tected, and therefore should represent property for taxing pur-
poses. 150
Even disregarding the impact of the Restatement, the 1961
Court of Claims decision, E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
United States,,5, should bind the Service to the relative secrecy
doctrine. DuPont defined trade secret to include "any informa-
tion not generally known in the trade . . . . The information is
frequently in the public domain . . . . A plurality of individual
discoverers may have protectible, wholly separate rights in the
same trade secret."152 Having so established the breadth of the
By measuring the component parts, they say, blueprints could have
been prepared and the most efficient productive method deduced. The fact
remains, however, that the defendants took unwarranted advantage of the
confidence which the Schreyers reposed in them and obtained the desired
knowledge without the expenditure of money, effort and ingenuity which the
experimental analysis of the model on the market would have required. Such
an advantage obtained through breach of confidence is morally reprehensible
and a proper subject for legal redress.
Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 159, 168 (D. Conn.), modified, 190 F.2d 921
(2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1962).
"I See note 140 supra; R. MnzRIM, supra note 7, § 2.05[3]; Cavitch, supra note 7, §
232.01[5].
"I Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape Corp., 23 Misc.2d 671, 192
N.Y.S.2d 102, 116 (1959).
"' See the discussion of Kewanee at text accompanying notes 111-119 supra, and the
discussion of relative secrecy at text accompanying notes 134-139 supra.
"I E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
,12 Id. at 911. In a similar case involving capital gains treatment of trade secrets,
Francis H. Shepard, 57 T.C. 600, 617-18 (1972), rev'd without opinion, 481 F.2d 1399 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974), the court quoted extensively from Tabor v.
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trade secret concept, DuPont concluded that trade secrets be-
come property for purposes of the capital gains sections of the
Code because, like patents, a trade secret affords its owner a
"means to competitive advantage."' 53 The court further noted,
however, that with trade secrets, unlike patents, one's competi-
tive advantage derives not from absolute rights but from one's
right to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the secret;' thus, if
the information is sufficiently secret to support a claim of misap-
propriation it will be property for the purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code. This conclusion is in marked contrast to the Serv-
ice's position that the secret can only be known by the employer
and those employees with a need to know.
B. Must the Information Be Unique, Novel and Original?
The Service's requirement that the information be in the
nature of an "invention" cannot withstand attack once the
preeminence of the concept of competitive advantage is estab-
lished. Again the Service fails to draw the distinction between the
absolute rights of patents and the relative rights of trade secrets.
Since a patent grants the owner an absolute monopoly and pre-
cludes ownership rights in others who may independently dis-
cover the invention, the invention must in fact be a clear advance
in technology in order to warrant such an exclusive property in-
terest.3 5 Specifically, the invention must be original, unique, and
novel. '56 However, since a trade secret constitutes something of
value sufficient to support a claim of breach of confidence, inven-
tiveness becomes a meaningless standard of assessment. 5 '
Rather, the correct approach is to determine if the information
is an "advance" in technology sufficient to provide its owner with
a competitive advantage.158 If the discovery has such a competi-
Hoffman, supra note 143, to support the conclusion that the disclosure must place the
information in the public domain before one's secret (i.e. property) is destroyed.
113 Id.; Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 30, 33 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
" 288 F.2d at 911-12; Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. at 34. See Francis
H. Shepard, Jr., 57 T.C. 600, 616-18 (1972), rev'd without opinion 481 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974).
"' The requirements of novelty and invention "are essential to patentability because
a patent protects against unlicensed use of the patented device or process even by one who
discovers it properly through independent research." RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 757 at 6-7.
1 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1970).
"5 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 at 7.
' See text at note 119 supra.
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tive value, then it must be a trade secret, and therefore should
be property for purposes of section 3 51 .111
The Service's test of invention, however, merely gives lip-
service to this concept of trade secret. In Revenue Ruling 64-56
the Service states that the information need not be patentable.""0
In Revenue Procedure 69-19 the Service repeats this statement
but nevertheless imposes a test of invention equivalent to that
required for a patent: "[T]he 'information' [must] represent a
discovery and, while not necessarily patentable, the 'information'
[must be] original, unique, and novel."''
The additional requirement that the information be
"original, unique, and novel" is totally contrary to the view es-
poused in the Restatement. The Restatement specifically states
that the test of competitive advantage does not demand high
standards of creativity. A trade secret need not be patentable;'
novelty and invention are not required.6 3 The information may
be nothing more than something which is clearly anticipated in
the prior art 6 4 or "[information] which is merely a mechanical
improvement that a good mechanic can make. "115 Certainly,
159 As has been argued above, anything qualifying as a trade secret under the Restate-
ment's definition must represent property, as required by DuPont and Kewanee. See text
accompanying notes 111-119 supra. This conclusion is further reinforced by the earlier
1961 DuPont decision which broadly defines what may constitute a trade secret. See text
accompanying notes 151-154 supra.
I" Information need not be "patentable in the patent law sense." 1964-1 (Part 1) C.B.
at 134.
"1 1969-2 C.B. at 302.
12 RE TATEMENT OF Torrs § 757, Comment b at 6.
"3 Id. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); University
Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 535 n.25 (5th Cir. 1974); Ko-
dekey Elec., Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 486 F.2d 449, 455 (10th Cir. 1973); Clark v. Bunker,
453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972); Water Serv., Inc. v. Tesco Chem. Inc., 410 F.2d 163,
172-73 (5th Cir. 1969); Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp.,
267 F. Supp. 726, 731 (S.D. Cal. 1967), modified, 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969); Seismo-
graph Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, 135 F. Supp. 342, 354 (E.D. La. 1955), modified,
263 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1958); Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 16 N.J. 252, 108 A.2d 442 (1954);
Henkle & Joyce Hardware Co. v. Maco Inc., 195 Neb. 565, 239 N.W.2d 772, 776 (1976);
Extrin Foods v. Leighton, 202 Misc. 592, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1952); R. MILOUM, supra note
7, § 2.08[21 and authorities cited therein at n.9.
I" See, e.g., E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struther-Dunn, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 890 (S.D. Ia. 1968);
Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549, 560 (D. Conn. 1964) Sinclair v. Aquarius
Elec., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654, 659 (1974); Mann v. Tatge Chem.
Co., 201 Kan. 326, 440 P.2d 640, 647 (1968); Gallowhur Chem. Corp. v. Schwerdle, 37 N.J.
Supr. 385, 117 A.2d 416, 421 (1955); Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. v. Cox, 50
N.YS.2d 643, 656 (S.Ct. 1944); R. MmGaim, supra note 7, at § 2.08[3].
I" RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 at 7. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works, Co.,
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there must be some element of "discovery" involved so that the
information contains an element of secrecy and thus provides the
owner with a competitive advantage.' But this liberal standard
of discovery is all that is required." 7
Consequently, if the information in fact provides its owner
with a competitive advantage, it does not matter if the
"discovery" may appear to be simple or obvious.'"1
Facts of great value may, like the lost purse upon the highway, lie
long unnoticed upon the public commons. Hundreds pass them by,
till one more observant than the rest makes the discovery. It is idle
73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir.), modified, 74 F.2d 934 (1934); Ranger Steel Prods. Corp. v.
Chodak, 128 N.Y.S.2d 607, 610 (S. Ct. 1953); Kamin v. Kuhnau, 233 Ore. 139, 374 P.2d
912, 917 (1962); R. MILGRIM, supra note 7, § 2.08[3] at 2-94. See Sloan v. Mud Prods.,
114 F. Supp. 916, 924-27 (N.D. Okla. 1953).
I" "[Slome novelty will be required if merely because that which does not possess
novelty is usually known; secrecy, in the context of trade secrets, thus implies at least
minimal novelty." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). Hooker
Chem. Corp. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 412 (W.D. Tenn. 1964); Sarkes
Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 265 (S.D. Cal. 1958) aff'd per
curiam, 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961).
"I "Quite clearly discovery is something less than invention. Invention requires gen-
ius, imagination, inspiration, or whatever is the faculty that gives birth to the inventive
concept. Discovery may be the result of industry, application, or be perhaps merely fortui-
tous. The discoverer, however, is entitled to the same protection as the inventor." A.O.
Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538 (6th Cir.), modified, 74 F.2d
934 (1934).
ISN The mere fact that the means by which a discovery is made are
obvious, that experimentation which leads from known factors to an ascer-
tainable but presently unknown result may be simple, we think cannot de-
stroy the value of the discovery to one who makes it, or advantage the
competitor who by unfair means, or as the beneficiary of a broken faith,
obtains the desired knowledge without himself paying the price in labor,
money, or machines expended by the discoverer.
A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538-39 (6th Cir.), modified,
74 F.2d 934 (1934). See Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 499 (2d Cir. 1953); Forest Labs.,
Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202, 208 (E.D. Wis. 1969), modified, 452 F.2d 621
(7th Cir. 1971); Mann v. Tatge Chem. Co., 201 Kan. 326, 440 P.2d 640, 647 (1968);
Cavitch, supra note 7, § 232.01161; see also Cooper, supra note 46, at 335 (1966).
There are other variations to the same broad approach. For example, one court asks
directly whether the discovery is simple and obvious in order to determine if the informa-
tion provides a competitive advantage. K&G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G&G Fishing Tool
Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 314 S.W.2d 782, 790 (1958) (holding that a magnetic fishing tool
represented a trade secret). California expresses a similarly broad standard: "[it has
been held that a trade secret in the broad sense consists of any unpatented idea which
may be used for industrial and commercial purposes." Sinclair v. Aquarius Elec., Inc., 42
Cal. App.3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654, 658 (1974) (holding that a portable device which
converted brain waves into an audible signal was a mechanical improvement over existing
stationary equipment and therefore was a trade secret.).
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to say that, in the eyes of the law, interest may not in such case
follow discovery."'
The test of competitive advantage has been sometimes stated as
"that modicum of originality which will separate it from everyday
knowledge."' 10 The broad concept of "modicum of originality"
can hardly be compared with the Service's narrow demand that
the information be original, unique, and novel.''
C. Are Mere Experience and Mere Plant Design Property?
Because the Service's "unique and novel" and "absolute se-
crecy" requirements fail to address the true property issue, the
competitive value of the information, those factors which the
Service has enumerated as guidelines for resolving these factual
controversies also become meaningless standards. Among those
items most concerning the Service in a section 351 know-how
transfer," 2 the two most striking are mere knowledge or efficiency
resulting from experience and information representing
"assistance in the construction of a plant building. . . or advice
as to the layout of plant machinery and equipment."1 3 The Serv-
ice will presume that these items constitute services.
Although admirably suited to the Service's design to expand
the "services exclusion" under section 351 to its greatest possible
breadth, these factors bear little relation to the Restatement's
concern for competitive advantage. Certainly "mere" knowledge
119 A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 1934),
modified, 74 F.2d 934 (1935).
"T0 Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 444 F.2d 1313, 1315 (5th Cir. 1971), quoted in Forest
Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 1971). The test may be alterna-
tively stated as that amount of "novelty" and "secrecy" necessary to make the knowledge
commercially valuable. Atlantic Wool Combing Co. v. Norfolk Mills, Inc. 357 F.2d 866,
869 (lst Cir. 1966).
" The requirement "that the know-how 'represents a discovery and, while not neces-
sarily patentable, the information is original, unique and novel,' is a serious deviation
from trade secret law. Such a requirement imposes a standard of discovery which is not
required by the courts, and which is contrary to controlling state common law under which
trade secrets are recognized, as well as state court decisions governing trade secrets. A
more appropriate criteria for deciding whether 'property' has been transferred might be a
determination of whether the conveyance of the know-how also conveys a competitive
advantage on the transferee." J. BiscHiL, supra note 1, 6.3b[3], 6-23-6-24 (emphasis
added). Nearly identical language can be found at R. Mn.GIuM, supra note 7, § 6.04[41
at 6-128.2.
"I' These factors are enumerated in Revenue Procedure 19, 1969-2 C.B. See note 182
infra for a discussion of those items not discussed in the text.
03 Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 302.
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or efficiency resulting from experience can represent property
within section 351 where that information amounts to a discov-
ery, i.e. commercially valuable experience."' Perhaps the purest
form of "mere experience" is a corporation's customer lists. In
assessing whether such lists are trade secrets (and thus property),
the courts have refused to impose requirements of novelty or ab-
solute secrecy. Rather the courts examine such lists in terms of
six factors set out in the Restatement, factors designed to assess
whether the information provides a competitive advantage.
7 5
'7, Defendants contend that plaintiff's processes, methods and materials
cannot be trade secrets, since they are known to and used by aircraft me-
chanics and engineers. This overlooks the fact that a knowledge of the partic-
ular process, method or material which is most appropriate to achieve the
desired result may itself be a trade secret. So may a knowledge of the best
combination of processes, methods, tools and materials.
Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 1958) (emphasis added).
Space Aero Products Co., Inc. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74, 80, cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965). Thus, where experience is competitively valuable it will be
given recognition as property: "The long experience of the plaintiffs enabled the defendant
to efficiently equip its plant by the installation and use of several processes and devices,
which although not patentable by the plaintiffs, yet were valuable additions to the equip-
ment being installed." Reynolds Metals Co. v. Skinner, 166 F.2d 66, 75 (6th Cir.) cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 858 (1948). See also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Oh. App.
493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963).
'T The Restatement specifically includes customer lists as potential trade secrets. §
757 at 5. The Restatement then enumerates the following factors to be considered in
reviewing all potential trade secrets:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2)
the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his
business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of
the information; (4) the value of the information to him and his competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the infor-
mation; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be pro-
perly acquired or duplicated by others.
RESTATEMENT § 757 at 6. Perhaps indicative of the difficult factual issues presented, the
courts have been particularly willing to apply these factors to specifically consider whether
customer lists will qualify as trade secrets. Republic Sys. & Programming, Inc. v. Com-
puter Assistance, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 619, 628 (D. Conn. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 996 (2d Cir.
1971); Cudahy Co. v. American Laboratories, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (D. Neb. 1970);
Basic Chem., Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220, 226 (Ia. 1977); Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v.
Crampton, 361 Mass. 835, 282 N.E.2d 921, 925 (1972); Abbott Labs. v. Norse Chem. Corp.,
33 Wisc.2d 445, 147 N.W.2d 529, 538-39 (1967).
It is noteworthy that the Restatement makes no reference to "mere experience";
rather, the factors recited above specifically assess the competitive value of the informa-
tion. If "mere experience" satisfies the competitive advantage test, it will be protected as
a trade secret. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. F.T.C., 409 F. Supp. 297, 303 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 548
F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976), which applied the same six factors of the Restatement to rule
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Thus, the courts will protect customer lists where substantial
effort by a competitor would be required in order to duplicate the
information.'
In fact, customer lists specifically illustrate the distorted
construction of "property" which the Service advocates for sec-
tion 351. For purposes of section 1621 the Service readily main-
tains that customer lists represent "property" which must be
capitalized rather than expensed in the year of purchase. The
courts have unquestionably adopted the view that customer lists
are property; the only issue is whether they are amortizable prop-
erty under section 167' 77 of the Code.'78 Since customer lists are
"property," and since a customer list can be nothing but some-
one's accumulated "experience," how can the Service maintain
that Ashland's gas reserves estimates were trade secrets for purposes of the federal Free-
dom of Information Act; United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487, 490 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965), which ruled, without discussion, that oil maps were property
for purposes of section 351.
,'7 See, e.g., Basic Chem., Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220, 229 (Ia. 1977); Heyman
v. A.R. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584, 590 (2d Cir. 1963). See also the exhaustive discussion
of customer lists in Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 7 (1969).
Section 162(a) provides that "there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business .... " Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1 states in part that a business expense deduction
will not be granted to the extent that an item "is used by the taxpayer in computing the
cost of property included in its inventory or used in determining the gain or loss basis of
its plant, equipment, or other property." Where an asset acquired for one's trade or
business has a useful life in excess of one year, it is generally deductible under section
162. See, e.g., Manhattan Co. of Va., 50 T.C. 78, 86 (1968); Richard M. Boe, 35 T.C. 720,
725 (1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1962).
'" Section 167 states the rules concerning the depreciation deduction allowable for
property used in a trade or business, or property held for the production of income. Treas.
Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 provides that an intangible asset can be depreciated where it has a
limited useful life "which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy." Notably, the most
"intangible" of assets, goodwill, although not depreciable due to its indefinite life, is
nonetheless considered "property" within the meaning of section 167. Treas. Reg.
1.167(a)-3; see, e.g., Comm'r v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1963); Robert B. Tomlinson,
58 T.C. 570 (1972);Edward A. Kenney, 37 T.C. 1161 (1962).
"' The following commercial lists were granted property status for the purpose of
section 167: a list of fuel oil customers, Sunset Fuel Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d 781
(9th Cir. 1975) and Holden Fuel Oil Co., 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 184 (1972); newspaper sub-
scription lists, Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.
1973); cable television customer lists, General Tele., Inc. v. United States, 77-2 U.S.T.C.
(CCH) 9688 (D. Minn. 1977); laundry service customer lists, National Serv. Indus., Inc.
v. United States, 379 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ga. 1973) and Manhattan Co. of Va., 50 T.C.
78 (1968); credit information files, Computing & Software, Inc., 64 T.C. 223 (1975); and
a pharmacy prescription file, Grant T. Rudie, Jr., 49 T.C. 131 (1967).
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that something which is "mere experience" is presumptively not
property?
In the same fashion, advice as to plant construction or the
lay out of machinery may also represent property where such
advice concerns knowledge not in the public domain, knowledge
that will afford the transferee an advantage over competitors who
lack the benefit of such advice. Certainly the design of a manu-
facturing process, in some instances necessarily including plant
design and the lay-out of machinery, qualifies as a trade secret
where the discovery test is met.' Even the most abstract forms
of production designs, or lay-outs, such as marketing tech-
niques' "8 or computer programs, " ' are granted trade secret protec-
"I' It is also of no consequence that the elements of the process or design are all of
public knowledge. "[A] trade secret can exist in a combination of characteristics and
components, each of which, by itself, is in the public domain, but the unified process,
design and operation of which, in unique combination, affords a competitive advantage
and is a protectable secret." Imperial Chem, Indus. Ltd. v. National Distillers & Chem.
Corp., 342 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1965). In other words, this combination of known pro-
cesses will be a trade secret "if the combination of the interrelated parts represented a
valuable contribution arising from plaintiff's independent efforts." Ferroline Corp. v.
General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 921 (7th Cir. 1953) cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953
(1954). See, e.g., Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 1958); Space
Aero Prods. Co., Inc. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74, 80 (1965); Cavitch,
supra note 7, § 232.01[3]. See also Eastern Marble Prods. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc.
364 N.E.2d 799 (Mass. 1977).
,m For example, in Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972) plaintiff developed
a marketing scheme for prepaid funeral services plans. Defendant alleged that he could
not have misappropriated the scheme as it was not a trade secret. In the first instance
the scheme was to a great degree based on elements of other marketing programs already
of public knowledge. And secondly, the scheme had been sold to or discussed with a
number of others in the mortuary business and therefore was no longer secret.
The court rejected both arguments. Even though the plan was not unique and novel
the district court had found that the plan afforded plaintiff a marked advantage over
competitors, and was therefore a trade secret. Similarly, the disclosures of the plan did
not defeat its status as a trade secret since "[slubstantial effort would be required to
assemble the detailed elements of the plan from publicly available sources." Id. at 1010.
The court in Wilkes v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1135 (D.S.C. 1974), granted
similar trade secret protection to a scheme for marketing life insurance. The court com-
mented: "The forms and plans consisted of a combination of many commonly used prac-
tices, but were combined in a way that had not been used before, and gave plaintiff a
marked advantage over competitors." Id. at 1139. Thus where a business design provides
a competitive advantage, that design will be a trade secret and thus property for purposes
of section 351.
Equally applicable to "mere efficiencies" and "advice as to plant construction," the
Restatement broadly recognizes any commercial practice as potentially a trade secret.
Thus a trade secret may "relate to the sale of goods or to other operations in the business,
such as a code for determining discounts, rebates or other concessions in a price list or
1978
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tion where substantial effort would be required to duplicate the
information. Since these items receive trade secret protection,
they should also represent property for the purposes of section 351
as well. Once again the key test is not whether the transfer takes
on the appearance of a service, but rather whether the knowledge
transferred supplies the transferee with a competitive advantage
over those who do not possess the knowledge."'2
catalogue, or a list of specialized customers, or a method of bookkeeping or other office
management." § 757(b) at 5.
18, In Rev. Proc. 36, 1974-2 C.B. 491, the Service cast a shadow on computer programs
as property under section 351 when it stated that computer software would be judged as
property according to the onerous conditions enumerated in Revenue Procedure 69-19. See
Flyer & Buell, supra note 4, at 27-29 for an argument that computer software would likely
not qualify as property if the Service applied a narrow definition to Revenue Ruling 64-
56.
Although there is little direct authority on point, it seems evident that the same test
of competitive advantage will also apply to computer software in determining if an ele-
ment of "property" exists in the program. See Bender, Trade Secret Protection of
Software, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 909 (1970). In Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v.
Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975), the court
avoided the specific issue of whether a computer program was a trade secret by finding
that there was no misappropriation in that defendants themselves had developed the
program. The court, nonetheless, held defendants liable for breaching their express con-
tract not to disclose confidential information:
The technical planning and development of NIESA [the program] to its
stage of development in January, 1973, including the selection of elements,
solver routine, organization of sub-routines, coding, and other factors con-
tributing to the efficiency and effectiveness of the program constituted im-
portant and confidential information, particularly prior to public release of
the program. The technical accomplishments of Surana and Kothwala re-
flected in their work on NIESA amounted to a compilation of information
which gave SDRC a competitive advantage. The existence or availability of
abstract technical data does not detract from the confidentiality of the com-
bination of such parts and data into a program of the type under
consideration.
Id. at 1116 (emphasis added).
In University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974)
the misappropriation involved a retail inventory control system consisting of both com-
puter hardware and software. Unfortunately the court made little effort to distinguish
between the hardware and the software, instead addressing the computer "system." None-
theless, it appears that the misappropriation at issue was predominantly, if not entirely,
a theft of the software. Id. at 529 & n.6. Relying on the Restatement, the court stated that
novelty was not required. Thus the system was a trade secret since it "had unique capabil-
ities and features which make it a valuable competitive product." Id. at 535.
For an analysis of the reasons for granting patent protection to computer software,
see, e.g., Note, Patentability of Computer Software: The Nonobviousness Issue, 62 IOWA
L. Rav. 615 (1976).
In The Service also presumes that the following will not qualify as section 351 prop-
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D. Is the "Incident to" Test the Restatement in Disguise?
Even the Restatement may define property for section 351
purposes too narrowly. The court in DuPont stated the test as
whether the transfer would confer a benefit, whether the informa-
tion constitutes a positive business asset; ss Stafford defined prop-
(1) Training of the transferee's employees which is essentially educational in nature.
Like the Service's distaste for mere knowledge or efficiency resulting from experience, the
proper question is not whether the knowledge resulted from experience or whether the
knowledge is training of employees; rather, the Service must ask if the knowledge provides
the transferee a competitive advantage. If the knowledge is of such value then it must be
property regardless of whether it was conveyed in the form of "training." See text accom-
panying notes 111-119 supra.
(2) Future transfers of information, such as new developments, and (3) information
developed especially for the transferee. Both of these prohibitions appear to be carryovers
from concepts peculiar to the capital gains sections. To qualify for capital asset status,
the property must be held by the taxpayer for the prescribed period and cannot constitute
property held "primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business ...... I.R.C. § 1221. Thus transfers of property to be created, or property
developed for the purpose of sale, would apparently not represent a "capital asset." But
see text accompanying notes 103-104 supra.
Section 351, however, requires only that "property" be transferred; 351 contains no
requirements that property must also qualify as a "capital asset." The DuPont decision
discussed in the text accompanying notes 226-230 infra expressly rejected this analogy
between section 1221 capital asset and section 351 property. Consequently, future trans-
fers of information developed specifically for the transferee must also qualify as property
for section 351, at least where that information meets the Restatement test of competitive
advantage.
(4) Information which is merely "the rights to tangible evidence of information such
as blueprints, drawings or other physical material on which it is recorded." If the Service,
by this statement, is requiring that the transferor convey the knowledge to implement the
plans along with the plans themselves in order for the transfer to qualify as a property
transfer, the Service's position apparently contradicts its statements that mere experience
and mere training cannot constitute property. If the Service is stating that blueprints and
drawings are not property, the Service has adopted a position directly contrary to unques-
tioned authority indicating that quite often blueprints and drawings are protected trade
secrets. See, e.g., Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); Tabor v. Hoffman,
118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889); R. MILGRIM, supra note 7, § 2.09[6] and authorities cited
therein.
(5) Finally, the Service presumptively denies property status to information which
is revealed by a patent, is the subject of a patent application, or is disclosed by the product
on which it is used or to which it is related. It is true that there can be no trade secret in
information which is revealed in a patent. However, while the information remains in the
form of a patent application trade secret protection is granted where the competitive
advantage test is met. R. MILGRIM, supra note 7, § 2.06[2], at 2-61 and authorities cited
at n.20; text accompanying notes 1-47 & 51 supra. The Service's statement that the
information cannot be disclosed by the product states the obvious. However, in applying
this rule one must recall that disclosure is judged by the permissive concept of competitive
advantage, not the more stringent requirements of absolute secrecy. See text accompany-
ing note 148 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
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erty in terms of what could be possessed, used, or transferred. 8"
In 1955 even the Service apparently adopted this broad view.
After stating that know-how is a right akin to secret processes and
secret formulas, the Service defined know-how as "something
that its possessor can grant to another for consideration."'" Simi-
larly, some courts assess the factual issue of competitive advan-
tage by examining whether the information has value on the open
market, i.e., whether the information is a positive business
asset. 1 8 Know-how which represents a "business asset," or know-
how which can be "transferred for consideration" may be but two
different expressions of the same test of competitive advantage.
All that should matter for tax purposes, however, is that the
potentially broader concept of business asset is the standard
applicable in transfers of know-how under section 351.
In practical effect, the "business asset" and "transferred for
consideration" tests have been what the courts have in fact been
using with respect to know-how transfers under section 351.
Rather than expressly adopting these broad definitions of prop-
erty for know-how purposes, the courts have found it easier to
expand the Service's interpretation of the "ancillary and subsidi-
ary to" exception, applying broader "incident to" language. How-
ever, the standard employed for defining "incident to" is the
same business value concept endorsed by DuPont and recognized
by the Restatement.' 7
For example, Mineral Products Co. recognized written in-
structions concerning the use of formulas, processes, and proce-
dures, consulting services, and future communications as to de-
velopments in the field as property under the "incident to" excep-
"' See text accompanying note 39 supra.
' Rev. Rul. 17, 1955-1 C.B. 389. This ruling, however, was not issued for the purposes
of defining property for section 351, but rather to make the distinction between property
and services for the purpose of determining royalty income. A similarly broad definition
of intangible property is advocated by the Service in Regulation 1.482-2(d)(3) quoted in
note 43 supra.
I" "The difficulty of securing the necessary details except by unlawful means is
evidenced by the substantial sum ($55,000) paid to appellee for a corporation which
appellee had formed to use the plan .... " Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1010 (9th
Cir. 1972). See, e.g., Extrin Foods v. Leighton, 202 Misc.2d 592, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429, 435
(1952).
" One author has already noted that use of a broad definition of know-how as prop-




tion. Specifications, quality-control procedures, and test data
were necessary for the effective utilization of the transferred for-
mulas, and were, therefore, implicitly business assets. Other in-
formation concerning sales, cost estimating, and application
techniques was also designated as property. In language strongly
reminiscent of a court applying the Restatement, the Tax Court
noted: "Even though much of the material was available to com-
petitors, it constituted valuable marketing information, devel-
oped through practice, which was oriented toward the particular
properties of the CAFCO products and which could be obtained
from no other source.'1
8
Additionally, in Bell, production know-how, including engi-
neering and manufacturing data, was granted property status
because they were "incident to" the patents. The court noted,
however, that the know-how conveyed "did not depend upon ref-
erence to the patent drawings'89 and was thus somewhat indepen-
dent of the patents. Apparently, what justified the treatment of
this know-how as property was not so much the integral relation-
ship between the know-how and the patents as it was the unques-
tioned competitive value of the know-how transferred. 90
Finally, Gable expressly minimizes the distinction between
patents and know-how. The Gable court stated that the "incident
to" exception was but "the recognition that a patent transfer is,
in large part, a transfer of knowledge."'' Know-how that "relates
to" the patents transferred, i.e. know-how that assists the buyer
"in implementing the acquired knowledge and in developing its
full potential," may be just as valuable as the patents them-
selves.9 " Gable implies that know-how "related to" the transfer
1 52 T.C. at 199. The court also found that the design of a device used to measure
the bulk density of fibers was a capital asset as the evidence indicated "that it was not
known to the trade." The parties to the contract transferring the asset had labelled the
device as know-how. Id. at 198.
,' 381 F.2d at 1020.
, "By virtue of the agreement with Bell, Agusta received the benefit
of the FAA certification and obtained engineering know-how . ..which
enabled it to build a small replica of the Bell Fort Worth plant and to enter
into the helicopter business without the years of research and development
and the expenditure of the millions of dollars which Bell had been required
to spend in order to develop this over-all helicopter know-how."
Id.
"' 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1433.
192 Id.
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of proprietary information constitutes property, even though it
strongly resembles services. 93 Viewed in this fashion, the
"incident to" exception is little more than the business asset test
adapted to the specific context of transfers of packages of technol-
ogy.
E. Does The Broad Concept of Property Permit the Taxpayer a
Choice of Law?
As noted in the historical analysis of section 351 above, there
has never been any question as to whether know-how will qualify
as property. Rather, the issue left unresolved is what forms of
know-how will qualify as property. In initial attempts to resolve
this issue, the courts and the Service have taken divergent paths.
Opinions analyzing section 351 indicate that the term "property"
is to be given its broadest construction. Similarly, courts discuss-
ing know-how as property under sections 1231 and 1235 reveal
that the "services exclusion" is to be applied to know-how spar-
ingly, if at all. The Service, however, persists in expanding the
concept of "services" to its maximum limits, while narrowly de-
fining what forms of know-how qualify as property. Because of the
broad definition given property under the decisions in DuPont
and Stafford, the Service's position must yield to the more lenient
standards of the Restatement, a definition of property endorsed
by the Supreme Court in Kewanee and implicitly recognized by
courts applying the "incident to" exception for services.
However, as also noted above, DuPont and Stafford may
stand for a broader concept of property than that expressed by
the Restatement. This conclusion is of particular importance
with respect to international transfers where the taxpayer faces
the additional issue of whose law of competitive advantage will
determine whether a particular form of know-how will be granted
property status. Revenue Ruling 64-56 states that the information
must be given substantial protection in the country in which the
transferee is to operate.'94 Revenue Procedure 69-19 incorporates
113 Thus the court granted capital asset status to transfers of future know-how as well,
based upon the value of this information in assisting the complete use of the patents
transferred. These future transfers were so related to the underlying patent rights that
even though not yet in existence, they would be granted capital asset status in defiance
of the requisite holding period. Id. at 1433-34. For a similar result, see Heil Co. 38 T.C.
989, 1003 (1962) discussed at text accompanying notes 73-78 supra, and PPG Industries,
55 T.C. 928, 1018 (1970) discussed at text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
"' Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 (Part I) C.B. 133.
VOL. 55
TRANSFERS OF KNOW-HOW
by reference the rules expressed in Revenue Ruling 64-56, and
expressly repeats the requirement that the information be sub-
stantially protected in the country in which it is to be used. How-
ever, in a somewhat contradictory fashion, the Procedure later
requires that the information be property within the meaning of
Revenue Ruling 64-56 and that it be protected under the laws of
the country from which it is being transferred. 5' To comply with
the United States law, the information must meet the absolute
secrecy and "unique and novel" tests already discussed. The Pro-
cedure then concludes that if these requirements are met, the
information will be deemed to be protected under the laws of the
transferee country as well, for the purposes of satisfying the ad-
vance ruling requirement of section 367. Significantly, the Service
does not state whether this assumption is rebuttable, that is,
whether the Service can later challenge a transfer under section
351 as not being protected under the law of the transferee coun-
try, even though the requirements for a pre-transfer 367 ruling
have been met. Although the change under section 367 to post-
transfer rather than pre-transfer rulings implemented by the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 may eventually eliminate this ambiguity by
eliminating the need for pre-transfer evaluation, at present the
Service's statements indicate a willingness to evaluate
"property" under the laws of both the transferor and transferee
countries. e11
Such fence-straddling by the Service ignores the courts'
broad definition of property. If any person is to be permitted a
"choice of law," it should be the taxpayer not the Service. The
Service is justified in relying on United States law where the law
of the transferee country is in substantial doubt or has yet to
develop.' 7 Nonetheless, in applying transferor country law the
"' Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 302.
'" Rev. Proc. 69-19 concludes by stating that "these procedures have no effect upon
the substantive provisions and requirements of Revenue Ruling 64-56." 1969-2 C.B. at 302.
But see Flyer & Buell, supra note 4, for an argument that satisfying Revenue Procedure
69-19 necessarily satisfies the "protection under the laws of the transferee" requirement
of Revenue Ruling 64-56.
"I Illustrative of the potential uncertainties of foreign law regarding know-how in
even the most highly developed countries see the discussion in A. WisE, TRADE SECRETS
AND KNOw-How THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (1974), Vol. 1, § 1.04[l] (Belgium) (1976); Vol.
3, § 3.06 (France) (1974); Vol. 3, § 4.02[4] (Germany) (1974); Vol. 4, § 5.01[31 (Italy)
(1974).
Because foreign law can create confusion, one might do better to address whether the
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Service should employ the proper interpretation of that law, i.e.
the liberal standards of the Restatement. Know-how which meets
the Restatement's competitive advantage test will be protected
in the United States, at least in Restatement jurisdictions. There-
fore that information must represent "property" within the broad
business asset concept expressed in DuPont. Taken one step fur-
ther, since DuPont defines property only in terms of "positive
business assets," not in terms of "protected business assets,"
once the Restatement has been satisfied, the information need no
longer be judged against the protection rules employed by the
transferee country. A recognized "asset" has been transferred,
even though that asset may not qualify as protected property
under stricter rules of foreign jurisdictions.
Conversely, what if a transferee nation employs broader rules
than those expressed in the Restatement?' 8 Will the taxpayer be
permitted to employ this broader definition of property? If the
transferee can protect his information in his country of business,
it becomes irrelevant under the business asset test whether that
information was also protected in the United States. If the trans-
feree can protect the information, then clearly a valuable asset
was transferred; the transferee has received a right capable of
ownership, use, or disposition and, therefore, has received prop-
erty under the definition expressed in Stafford. Indeed, if one law
is to govern to the exclusion of the other, logic dictates that the
law of the transferee nation control."' DuPont and Stafford pre-
information would be recognized as capable of supporting a contract for royalties, rather
than whether the information is property in and of itself. For example, although in France
the property law of information is in doubt, Wise's summary of one French case addressing
the royalty issue yields the very Restatement definition employed in the United States:
By providing an industrial establishment with processes or techniques un-
known to it, and which it could learn only through a considerable outlay of
research and development expenditure and after the lapse of some time and
effort, the licensor has provided the licensee with an appreciable advantage
for which it may exact a royalty. This is so even if the particular process or
technique is not secret.
3 A. WISE, supra, § 3.06[41, at 3-76 to 3-77 (1974).
198 As a possible example of a standard broader than the Restatement, see 1 A. Wise,
supra note 197, § 4.02[2] (1976), indicating that certain "technical skill" will receive
property protection in the Republic.
"' Because, in the case of transfer of the right to use a secret formula or
process in a foreign country, the laws of the foreign country are determinative
of the nature of the right being transferred, reference to the laws of the
country of the transferor would seem to be inappropriate.
Flyer & Buell, supra note 4, at 27.
VOL. 55
TRANSFERS OF KNOW-HOW
clude the Service from applying the laws of both the transferee
and transferor nations.
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES A TRANSFER FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION
351?
As demonstrated above, the broad definitions of property
expressed by the courts in such rulings as DuPont, Stafford, and
Hempt Bros. obligate the Service to apply equally broad stan-
dards in analyzing the specific question of what forms of know-
how will qualify as property under section 351. However, to focus
exclusively on the property question is to ignore the equally im-
portant issue of what constitutes a qualifying "transfer" under
the statute. 00 "Transfer" poses the question of what rights the
transferor may retain in the property, yet still have the convey-
ance of the property deemed a transfer within the nonrecognition
rules of section 351. One might expect that the lenient definition
of property, particularly as analyzed in DuPont, would generate
equally permissive standards regarding the kinds of transactions
that will qualify as "transfers." Nonetheless, the Service has
characteristically attempted to limit "transfer" to its strictest,
most limited meaning. Relying almost exclusively on the judicial
developments in the area of patent transfers for purposes of capi-
tal gains treatment under sections 1221, 1222, and especially
I" See note 1 and accompanying text supra. Both the words "transfer" and
"exchange" appear in section 351; however, the operative word is "transfer." Discussions
have emphasized that for purposes of section 351 bona ide "sales" do not qualify as
"transfers . . . in exchange". See, e.g., Stanley, Inc. v. Schuster, 295 F. Supp. 812, 815
(S.D. Ohio 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). Al-
though the precise scope of the word "transfer" has been repeatedly addressed, many
commentators have simply abided by the Service's restrictive rulings without questioning
their validity. For a general discussion of the word "transfer" for purposes of know-how
transfers under section 351, see BISCHEL, (no definition of what constitutes a transfer of
all substantial rights) supra note 1, at 6.3; CALIFORNIA COIrrINUING LEGAL EDUCATION,
ArroRNEys GUIDE To TRADE SEcRETs Ch. 6 (Brosnahan ed. 1971) (must transfer at least
the right to prevent unauthorized disclosure); MILGRIM, supra note 7, at § 6.04 (discussion
of the 1971 DuPont holding). See also Benjamin, supra note 44, at 200-01 (transfers of
know-how under section 351 governed by § 1235); Burke, supra note 20, at 756-57 (Rev.
Rul. 69-156 comports with legislative intent); Cohen, supra note 4, at 39-40 (Service's
transfer requirements are highly questionable); Cooper, supra note 46, at 335-38 (discus-
sion of the 1961 DuPont decision); Cooper, supra note 23, at 225-237 (discussion of transfer
concept); Creed & Bangs, supra note 23, at 101-02, (discussion of all substantial rights
test); Dunn, supra note 4, at 573-75 (discussion of the exclusivity element); Flyer & Buell,
supra note 4, at 30 (discussion of the exchange requirement); Pugh, Sales and Exchanges
of Foreign Patents, 20 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX 1305 (1962); Note, supra note 33, at 69
(Service's sale or exchange requirement is not supported by the Code).
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1235, the Service has formulated tough guidelines as to how one
may transfer know-how for purposes of section 351.21 Briefly
stated, only the unqualified transfer in perpetuity of the exclusive
right to make, use, and sell unpatented but secret products
"I I.R.C. § 1235 states: "A transfer (other than by gift, inheritance, or devise . . . of
all substantial rights to a patent . . . shall be considered the sale or exchange of a capital
asset .... " A strong argument may be made that it is only because of the presence of
the "all substantial rights" language of section 1235 and the characterization of this
provision as one of the capital gains provisions that limitation on the word "transfer"
arises. Section 351 contains neither of these limitations. Nevertheless, the Service has
been extremely successful in arguing that know-how should be treated similarly to the §
1235 treatment of patents. See PPG Indus., Inc., 55 T.C. 928, 1012 (1970); Edward W.
Reid, 50 T.C. 33, 40-41 (1968); Pickren v. United States, 378 F.2d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 1967);
Commercial Solvents Corp., 42 T.C. 455, 467-69 (1964); Kimble Glass Co., 9 T.C. 183, 190-
91 (1947); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 823, 833-34 (D.
Del. 1969), modified, 432 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1970); Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209 F.
Supp. 30, 33 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
An extensive body of law has developed regarding the elements necessary for a patent
transfer to qualify for capital gains treatment under section 1235. The debate has raged
primarily around the meaning of two phrases, "transfer" and "all substantial rights." For
a discussion of the development that only "sales" and not mere "licenses" are required
to qualify for section 1235 treatment, see Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255-58
(1890) (transfer must amount to an assignment not a mere license); E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052, 1053-57 (3d Cir. 1970) (transfer of
anything less than all substantial rights is a mere license); Redler Conveyor Co. v.
Comm'r, 303 F.2d 567, 568-69 (1st Cir. 1962) (citing the Waterman test); Carroll Pressure
Roller Corp., 28 T.C. 1288 (1957); Halsey W. Taylor, 16 T.C. 376, 381-84 (1951) (transfer
of entire interest constitutes a sale not a mere license); American Chem. Paint Co. v.
Smith, 131 F. Supp. 734, 737-39 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (preservation of substantial limitations
by transferor deemed this is a mere license); Thompson v. Johnson, 50-2 U.S. Tax. Cas.,
9428, 13127-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (citing the Waterman test). For a discussion of the "all
substantial rights" test, see William W. Taylor, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1488, 1492-96 (1970)
(must transfer the exclusive right to manufacture, use and sell); Jacques R. Milberg, 52
T.C. 315, 317-20 (1969) (mere license because transferor retained use after license termi-
nated); Allied Chem. Corp. v. United States, 370 F.2d 697, 699-700 (2d Cir. 1967) (enough
control retained by transferor to preclude transfer from being a sale); Young v. Comm'r,
269 F.2d 89, 91-94 (2d Cir. 1959) (right to terminate at will destroyed by sale treatment);
Buckley v. Frank, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9525, 57055-61 (W.D. Wash. 1957). For a detailed
discussion of the overall developments in the field of section 1235 transfers of patents see
Campbell, supra note 21, at 32-42; Cooper, supra note 46, at 334-38; Cooper, supra note
23, at 213-37; Morreale, Patents, Know-How and Trademarks: A Tax Overview, 29 TAx
LAW. 553 (1976); Pugh, supra note 200; Ramunno, U.S. Tax Aspects of International
Licensing Agreements, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 113 (1975).
The following rights have been held to be substantial: (1) right to terminate (Lynn
Gregg, 18 T.C. 291, 302 (1952), aff'd 203 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1953)); (2) geographical limita-
tions (Don Keuneman, 68 T.C. 609 (1977)); (3) terms for years (Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-
2(b)(iii)); (4) field of use restrictions (David R. Blake, 67 T.C. 7, 13-16 (1976)). In contrast,
retention of the following rights has been held to be insubstantial: (1) legal title as security
(Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(2)(i)); (2) provision for forfeiture for nonperformance (Treas.




within all the territory of a country will be treated as the transfer
of all substantial rights in the property in that country.2 '
The "all substantial rights" requirement carried over from
patent transfer cases under the capital gains provision, section
1235, to know-how transfers under section 351(a) has been fleshed
out by Regulation § 1.1235-2(b) which defines the phrase as not
including a grant of rights (1) which is limited geographically
within the country of issuance; (2) which is limited in duration
by the terms of the agreement to a period less than the remaining
life of the patent; (3) which grants rights to the grantee in fields
of use within trades or industries, which are less than all the
rights covered by the patent, which exist and have value at the
time of the grant; and (4) which grants to the grantee less than
all the claims or inventions covered by the patent which exist and
have value at the time of the grant. 0 3 In recent years, the courts
have upheld the validity of all four of these subsections with
regard to patent transfers pursuant to section 1235.204 In attempts
to implement the statutory scheme of section 1235, as interpreted
in the regulations promulgated thereunder, the courts, in Fawick
212 Rev. Rul. 1956, 64-1 C.B. 133, 135. The Service also stated in the ruling: "The
unqualified transfer in perpetuity of the exclusive right to use a secret process or other
similar secret information qualifying as property within all the territory of a country..."
will be treated as a transfer of all substantial rights." Id. Rev. Rul. 64-56 was amplified
in Rev. Rul. 564, 1971-2 C.B. 179 where the Service ruled that in order for all substantial
rights in a trade secret to be transfered, the transferor must transfer to the transferee the
use of the trade secret for its full life. For a general discussion of the Service's position
see 70-20 TAX MANAGEMENT MEMORANDUM, supra note 66, at 6-15.
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (1965). The present section 2(b) of the regulation was
not adopted until 1965, one year after Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133. See T.D. 6852, 1965-
2 C.B. 289.
"I See Don Keuneman, 68 T.C. 609 (1977) (the Tax Court reversed its pro-taxpayer
stance in Estate of George T. Klein, 61 T.C. 332 (1973), rev'd, 507 F.2d 617, 621 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975), and Vincent B. Rodgers, 51 T.C. 927 (1969), and
held that pursuant to regulation § 1.1235-2(b), licensing agreements containing geo-
graphic limitations were not "sales and exchanges" of all substantial rights in a patent);
David R. Blake, 67 T.C. 7, 13-16 (1976) (the Tax Court reversed its pro-taxpayer stance
taken in Mros. v. Comm'r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 519 (1971), rev'd, 493 F.2d 813, 816 (9th Cir.
1974), and Fawick v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 104 (1969), rev'd, 436 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1971) and
held that based on regulation § 1.1235-2(b), licensing agreements containing field of use
restrictions did not constitute "sales or exchanges" of all substantial rights in a patent);
William W. Taylor, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1488, 1493-94 (1970) (transfer is not a sale where
the rights to manufacture, use, and sell were not exclusive); PPG Indus., Inc., 55 T.C.
928, 1014 (1970) (transfers for a fixed term of years did not constitute the "sale or ex-
change" of all substantial rights in the technology).
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v. Commissioner, a 1971 Sixth Circuit decision, '05 and Mros. v.
Commissioner, a 1974 Ninth Circuit decision, 06 formulated a two-
step test for section 1235 "transfers": What did the taxpayers
actually give up, and what did the transferor retain? 07 In the
recent decision, Don Keuneman,'2 8 the two-tier analysis of Fawick
and Mros20° was relied upon by the Tax Court in its denial of
capital gains treatment to a licensing agreement containing a
geographical limitation provision .
2
0
The analogy by the Service from the traditional "sale or
exchange" interpretation of the transfer language in section 1235
to the "transfer . . . in exchange" language of section 351(a),
particularly with respect to transfers of secret information and
know-how, has been almost complete. In Revenue Ruling 64-56,
the Service ruled that a transfer will qualify under section 351 if
the transferred rights extend to all of the territory of one or more
countries and consist of all substantial rights therein, the transfer
being clearly limited to such territory, notwithstanding the fact
that rights are retained as to some other country's territory."'
52 T.C. 104 (1969), rev'd, 436 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1971).
30 T.C.M. (CCH) 519 (1971), rev'd, 493 F.2d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1974).
See Mros, 493 F.2d at 816 (two-fold test-(1) what did the taxpayer actually give
up, and (2) what did he retain after the transfer?); Fawick, 436 F.2d at 662 (two-pronged
test-(1) what the holder has left after the transfer, and (2) what he relinquished to the
transferee). Support for this two-pronged test in both cases was premised upon S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 439-40, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4785, 5082-83. For a detailed discussion of Mros, Fawick, Klein, Rodgers, Blake, and
Senate Report 1627, see Don Keuneman, 68 T.C. 609 (1977). See also Hagen, Are Capital
Gains Still Available Via Patent Fragmentation: A Current Analysis, 43 J. TAX. 78, (1975);
Rodgers, Transfer of Patent Rights, 61 A.B.A.J. 374 (1975).
20 68 T.C. 609 (1977).
2' See note 204 supra.
210 68 T.C. at 612-19. The court noted that if a patent could be sliced into smaller
segments, and the "all substantial rights" test satisfied merely by transferring all such
rights with respect to the segment, capital gains treatment would be allowed despite the
retention of valuable rights. Id. at 618. In contrast to Keuneman, in Vincent B. Rodgers,
51 T.C. 927, 930 (1969), the Tax Court limited the "substantial rights" test to merely the
rights to "make, use, and sell" and rejected the Service's interpretation of section 1235 as
found in Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b).
"I Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133, 135. See also notes 60-63, and 202 supra. Compare
Cohen, supra note 20, at 40 (the Service's field of use restrictions are highly questionable
in light of past judicial recognition of the validity of such provisions), and Note, supra
note 22, at 54, (the Service's "sale or exchange" test is not supported by section 351 or
the regulations), with Duffy, supra note 20, at 1290-92 (secret industrial know-how is
capable of being sold for capital gains purposes to a purchaser who acquires the exclusive
and perpetual right to use the know-how in a particular country and the right to prevent
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Except for Revenue Ruling 64-56's response to a hypothetical
problem, neither the courts nor the Service have had an oppor-
tunity to apply or interpret the ruling's restrictive field-of-use and
geographic limitations to a licensing agreement of know-how in
gross. 212
The Service has also argued for the grafting of two other
limitations upon section 351(a), namely, "exclusivity" and "in
perpetuity. 2 1 Analogizing to its successes under section 1235, the
Service in Revenue Ruling 64-56 emphasized that a transfer of
exclusive rights is one element necessary to the finding that a
transfer qualifies under section 351.214 In the 1967 decision,
United States Mineral Products Co., the Service unsuccessfully
raised the exclusivity issue with regard to the transfer of certain
know-how215 under the capital gains rules. Recognizing the inher-
ent validity of the Service's argument as premised on the regula-
tions under section 1235, the Tax Court examined the "licensing"
agreement involved, and contrary to the Service's urging found
the seller and others from disclosing or using the know-how in that country). The degree
of resemblance between Rev. Rul. 64-56 and the Duffy formulation are uncanny.
"I The closest a court has come to discussing geographic limitations in a know-how
license may be found in United States Mineral Prods. Co., 52 T.C. 177 (1969) where the
court explicitly held: "By granting to CAFCAN the exclusive right within the territorial
limits of Canada to use and to grant to others the right to use the formulas and the design
.a "sale" occurred. Id. at 198-99. The primary authority cited by the Service to
support its position in Rev. Rul. 64-56 was Lanova Corp., 17 T.C. 1178 (1952). Although
recognizing that the transfer of the exclusive right to use an invention in the United States
and other North and South American countries constituted a tax-free transfer under §
112(b)(5) (the predecessor of section 351; see note 25 and accompanying text supra), the
court's primary focus was on a totally different issue, the basis for such assets. Id. at 1179.
At no point in the opinion did the court ever discuss geographical limitations in licensing
agreements. Totally contrary to the Service's position in 1964, there was every indication
that geographical limitations and field-of-use restrictions were permissible. See, e.g., R.N.
Crank, 135 F. Supp. 242, 253 (W.D. Pa. 1955) (patent rights may be limited geographically
or to a particular industry and still qualify as a sale). Language of similar breadth may
be found in William S. Rouverol, 42 T.C. 186, 192-94 (1964).
2' Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b). See notes 201-203 and accompanying text supra. See
Puschelberg v. United States, 330 F.2d 56, 60 (6th Cir. 1964) (exclusivity is a prerequisite
to capital gains treatment in a patent transfer). See also Young v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d 89,
91-94 (2d Cir. 1959) (right to terminate at will is the retention of a substantial right); Rev.
Rul. 156, 1969-1 C.B. 101 where the Service emphasized the importance of the exclusivity
element in the transfer of a patent under section 351.
See notes 201-203 and 213 and accompanying text supra.
,,5 52 T.C. at 191. The Service phrased its argument somewhat differently, urging
that the exclusivity issue went to whether or not the formulas even constituted property
under I.R.C. §§ 1221 or 1231.
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that the transferor actually had granted an exclusive right to the
transferee within the territorial limits of Canada to use, and to
grant to others the right to use, the technical information in ques-
tion.21 In Taylor-Winfield Corp., the Service again raised the
argument that certain transfers of technology constituted no
more than an exclusive grant of rights for a term of years followed
by a nonexclusive grant of rights thereafter in perpetuity.21t Not
faring as well as the transferor in United States Mineral Products
Co., the taxpayer was unable to convince the Tax Court that
Mineral Products was controlling.2ts Despite the presence of ex-
clusivity language in the license, the Tax Court found that the
retention of a sublicensing veto power by the transferor rendered
the licensing agreement no more than a terminable license of
unpatented technology and therefore was not a sale or exchange
for capital gains purposes. 9
The Service's final and most successful basis for attack upon
transfers of know-how under section 1235 "sales or exchanges"
has been the "in perpetuity" requirement. Attempting to clarify
the meaning of this requirement, in the analogous context of a
section 351 transfer as discussed in Revenue Ruling 64-56, the
Service, in Revenue Ruling 71-564, held that a transfer of know-
how under section 351(a) will constitute a qualified transfer if the
rights are granted for a period lasting at least until the secret
becomes public knowledge and is no longer protectible under the
transferee country's laws. 20 The case law has unanimously sup-
"' Id. at 177-200. Reviewing the language of the CAFCAN agreement, id. at 188, the
court concluded that an exclusive license had been granted with respect to the know-how.
In contrast, the CAFCUS agreement although granting exclusive rights failed the "in
perpetuity" test. Id. at 195. See notes 220-225 and accompanying text infra.
". 57 T.C. at 213.
The court distinguished Mineral Prods. Co., 52 T.C. 177 (1969) on the grounds that
the rights to sublicense was granted to the transferee in that case. Unlike Mineral Prods.
Co., in Taylor- Winfield Corp., the transferee was precluded from sublicensing without the
transferor's consent. In addition, the transferee was to hold the information in total confi-
dentiality and secrecy. 57 T.C. at 219.
"I Delving beneath the mere form of the agreement, namely an exclusive license in
perpetuity, the court found the transaction to constitute no more than a terminable license
of unpatented technology. Id. For similar treatment of the issue of exclusivity of the right
to prevent unauthorized disclosures by the transferees, see Edward W. Reid, 50 T.C. 33
(1968); Commercial Solvents Corp., 42 T.C. 455, 469 (1964); E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 912 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209
F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
2' Rev. Rul. 564, 1971-2 C.B. 179. More succinctly stated, the transfer must be for
the life of the secret information.
VOL. 55
TRANSFERS OF KNOW-HOW
ported this position with respect to the capital gains "sale or
exchange" rules. In Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States,
PPG Industries, Inc.,222 and Taylor-Winfield Corp.,'2 3 grants for
terms of years were denied capital asset status for failing the "in
perpetuity" test.
224
Amplifying its position in Revenue Ruling 64-56, the Service
restated its position in another section 351 ruling:
Secret information is sufficiently akin to patents to warrant the
application, by analogy, of some of the principles of law relating to
the transfer of patent rights .... The grant of patent rights . . .
will constitute a transfer of property within . . . section 351 . . .
only if the grant of these rights . . . would constitute a sale or
exchange of property rather than a license for purposes of determin-
ing the character of gain or loss.
In order for a grant of patent rights to constitute a sale or ex-
change, the grant must consist of all substantial rights to a pat-
ent. . . . Likewise, in order for all substantial rights in a trade
secret to be transferred, the transferor must transfer to the trans-
feree the use of the trade secret for its full life . . . 5
Unfortunately the Service has totally ignored the policy and sta-
tutory construction grounds for distinguishing the meaning of the
word "transfer" in section 1235 from its meaning in section 351,
focusing instead upon the alleged sufficiency of kinship between
secret information and patents. Revenue Ruling 71-564 is an ex-
cellent example of the confusion generated in this area by the
Service's failure to distinguish the transfer issue from the prop-
erty issue.
The major breakthrough for the taxpayer occurred in two
decisions in 1973 and 1974. First, in the 1973 decision E.I. DuPont
de Nemours and Co. v. United States, the Court of Claims was
presented with the issue of whether a nonexclusive license of a
patent constituted a qualifying "transfer" of property under sec-
-1 381 F.2d 1004, 1020-21, 1022-23 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (the right to terminate without
notice, by either side, at the end of the first ten years of the agreement, constitutes the
retention of a substantial right in the information under sections 1221 and 1222).
?2 55 T.C. 928, 1013-15 (1970) (transfer for a term of years is not the sale of all
substantial rights in the information under section 1221).
- 57 T.C. 205, 214-20 (1971) (the right to terminate at the end often years constitutes
the retention of a substantial right in the information for purposes of section 1235).
"I See also Pickren v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 560 (M.D. Fla. 1965), aff'd, 378
F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1967) (twenty-five year transfer was not a transfer of all substantial
rights in certain formulas).
I Rev. Rul. 564, 1971-2 C.B. 179, 180. See also note 202 supra.
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tion 351.226 Recognizing that the Service's position rested entirely
upon the case law and regulations under section 1235,227 and con-
trasting totally contradictory purposes expressed in the legisla-
tive history of the two statutory provisions,22 1 the Court of Claims
stated: "In other words, the capital gains concept of a 'sale and
exchange' is simply irrelevant to section 351, which has a quite
different purpose and an independent postulate."2 9 The court,
comparing the purposes of the two statutes, observed that the
core of section 351 was continuity of interest and continuity of
control, while to the contrary, section 1235 treatment was trig-
gered only by the complete divestiture of any interest in the pat-
ent transferred.2 30 Aptly, the court remarked: "It would be odd to
hold that a transfer had to look most like a complete disposition
in order to avoid being treated for tax purposes as a complete
disposition."
3'
The total underpinnings of the Service's position having been
eroded, the court found it only a small step to include a nonexclu-
sive license of substantial value, commonly thought of in the
commercial world as a positive business asset, within the defini-
tion of property for purposes of section 351.232 In effect, therefore,
the court focused primarily on the issue of whether a mutual
exchange of valuable items had occurred.
22' 471 F.2d 1211, 1212-13 (Ct. Cl. 1973). For a detailed discussion of the court's
"property" analysis see notes 34-38 and accompanying text supra.
2" Id. at 1213. The Service relied heavily on the fact that original section 351 (§
112(b)(5)) and the capital gains provisions both had their origins in closely related provi-
sions of the Revenue Act of 1921. Id. at 1217. Compare ch. 136, § 202(c)(3), 42 Stat. 230
(1921) (current version at I.R.C. § 351) with ch. 136, § 206, 42 Stat. 232-33 (1921) (current
version at I.R.C. §§ 1201-1254). The court quickly disposed of the Service's argument by
noting that the great variance in purposes between section 351 and the capital gains
provisions greatly outbalanced any elements of cognate origin or statutory juxtaposition.
Id. at 1218.
11 Id. at 1213-16. The court noted that the capital gains provisions use such language
as "capital assets" and "sale/exchange", while section 351 is couched in terms of
'property" and "transferred ... in exchange." Id. at 1214. More importantly, the capi-
tals gains provisions are concerned with total divestiture while the core of section 351 was
"continuance-of-taxpayer-control." Id. at 1214-15. In effect section 351 was aimed at
deferring tax until a true outside disposition was made. Id. at 1214. For a discussion of
the legislative history behind section 351, see notes 25-31 and accompanying text supra.
To ignore this distinction between section 351 and the capital gains provisions is to
emasculate the 80% control requirement of section 351.
2" Id. at 1217.
11* Id. at 1214-18. See also note 225 supra.
231 Id. at 1217.
' Id. at 1218. See notes 34-40 and accompanying text supra.
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Barely a year later, in May of 1974, the Supreme Court
sounded the death knell for the Service's section 1235-351 anal-
ogy. As discussed in part II of this article, the Supreme Court
implicitly adopted the Restatement of Torts, section 757, defini-
tion of trade secret as a federal trade secret standard in Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.2M In effect, the Restatement recognizes
that any secret compilation of information may qualify as a pro-
tected interest as long as it gives the possessor of such information
a competitive advantage over those who do not know it or use it.234
Similar language had already been applied to the transfer of
know-how in 1961, when foreshadowing Kewanee, the Court of
Claims in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States held:
"In each case [transfers of patents and trade secrets] the trans-
feree . . .gets more than mere information. Of greater import-
ance, he obtains what he believes to be a competitive advantage,
a means for commercial exploitation and reward.
235
The importance of the Kewanee decision rests therefore in its
implicit rejection of the two-step Fawick-MrosM test for deter-
mining what constitutes a transfer of "all substantial rights." As
properly noted in Kewanee, the perspective from which a trade
secret or know-how transfer must be viewed is from that of the
transferee, not the transferor; 237 what the transferor has retained
- 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1970). For a discussion of the specific impact of Kewanee in
trade secret law, see notes 110-121 and accompanying text supra.
" 416 U.S. at 474. See also notes 110-193 and accompanying text supra,
" 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
See notes 207 and accompanying text supra.
The Restatement definition makes competitive advantage both an indicia of as
well as an element of a trade secret. RESTATEMENT OF ToETs § 757 (1939), as cited in
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 474-75. In contrast, the value afforded the information received by
the transferee is totally ignored under the Mros-Fawick two-step test. (493 F.2d at 816;
436 F.2d at 662). As noted in DuPont, 471 F.2d at 1215, running throughout all of the
capital gains provisions is a requirement that the transferee fully and completely divest
himself of any interest in the transferred asset. The Code determines that gain or loss is
to be determined at the time of the transfer. Consequently, the only way to determine if
a sale has occurred is to determine if the transferor has retained any interest that would
indicate a transaction falling short of a sale. In contrast, the very purpose of section 351
is to avoid the complete divestiture of ownership of the information by the transferor. 471
F.2d at 1215. See also notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra. See particularly, S. REP.
No. 265, 67th Cong. Ist Sess. 11 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (part 2) 188. As noted
in the DuPont decision, to give meaning to the control element under section 351, yet in-
sist upon a "sale or exchange" is to bring about "disparate results not rationally connected
to the fundamental principle behind section 351." 471 F.2d at 1217. The nature of the
Kewanee competitive-advantage test is perfectly suited for section 351. Once the
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is irrelevant in a section 351 transfer, if the assets transferred to
the transferee will result in a competitive advantage to him.
Once one shifts to a test of "commercial advantage" to the
transferee, many of the Service's positions regarding qualifying
"transfers" become less defensible. The transfer of a trade secret
or know-how which confers a commercial advantage upon the
transferee-possessor who operates in a particularly limited sphere
of business is no less property or no less a qualified transfer sim-
ply because the transferee's business or market extends over a
geographical area encompassing less than the geographic bounds
of the transferee's country.131 Similarly, commercial advantage
transferred to a corporation in one particular field-of-use may be
totally unaffected by the transferor's conveyance or retention of




"perspective of the transferor" test is abandoned only one participant's vantage point
remains, that of the transferee. This test was implicitly adopted in DuPont, 471 F.2d at
1219. The court noted that DuPont "handed over" something of value, received stock in
exchange, there was no disposition to an outsider, and the transferee remained in control;
in retrospect, the very form of transaction that section 351 was aimed at. Id. at 1219.
Should the Service contend that such a broad approach would open the floodgates for tax
evasion, I.R.C. §§ 482 and 367 remain as powerful protectors of the federal fisc. Id. at 1220.
Clearly the Service, the courts, and the legal commentators have noted that sec-
tion 1235 excludes licenses containing geographical limitations from the concept of sales
of all substantial rights. See, e.g., Don Kueneman, 68 T.C. 609 (1977); Estate of George
T. Klein, 61 T.C. 332 (1973), rev'd, 507 F.2d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 991 (1975); Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (1965); Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133; Burke,
supra note 20, at 755-57; Duffy, supra note 20, at 1290-92. However, once the analogy to
section 1235 is removed, the prohibition on geographical limitations seems less supporta-
ble. The most that can be said about an agreement containing a geographical limitation
is that it is not a sale. However, to qualify for section 351 treatment this is exactly what
the transferor must argue. The very structure of the language of section 1235 recognizes
that a license containing a geographical limitation is a transfer; the statute reads: "A
transfer . . . of property consisting of all substantial rights . . . shall be considered the
sale or exchange." The Service has never argued that such tainted licenses are not trans-
fers, but merely they are not sales. See the Tax Court decisions in Estate of George T.
Klein, 61 T.C. 332 (1973), rev'd, 507 F.2d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
991 (1975); Vincent B. Rodgers, 51 T.C. 927 (1969). There is no reason to read into the
word "transfer" a requirement that the transfer be inclusive within the entire geographic
bounds of a country.
2 Recently, field-of-use limitations have also run into stiff opposition. See Blake v.
Comm'r, 67 T.C. 7 (1976); Mros v. Comm'r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 519 (1971), rev'd, 493 F.2d
813 (9th Cir. 1974); Fawick v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 104 (1969), rev'd, 436 F.2d 655 (6th Cir.
1971). See also the Revenue Ruling and articles discussed in note 200-01 supra. The same
analysis used in note 238 supra is equally applicable, if not more so, to field-of-use restric-
tions. If a sale is the last form of transaction and the transferor means to effect under
VOL. 55
TRANSFERS OF KNOW-HOW
As for the "exclusivity" and "in perpetuity" requirements
espoused by the Service in the recent revenue rulings,4 0 an anal-
ogy to field-of-use and geographic limitations analysis, as dis-
cussed above, may open to the taxpayer new avenues of attack
upon the Service's position. By focusing on the broad meaning of
the word "transfer" and by emphasizing the "competitive advan-
tage" test of the Restatement and Kewanee,"4 ' the taxpayer may
successfully argue that grants for less than the life of the trade
secret or know-how, or retention by the transferor of the right to
license others besides the transferee, may not appreciably lessen
the advantage gained by the transferee. As discussed earlier, if
the two-tier "what-has-been-retained" test of Mros and Fawick42
is not applicable to a section 351 transfer, the transferor's reten-
tion of certain substantial rights should only preclude section 351
treatment if the transferee's right (competitive advantage) is
materially impaired or diminished. Specific factual settings
therefore must be examined to determine what effect such limita-
tions may have upon the transferee. In addition, the Service al-
ways has sections 482 and 367 to fall back on in the event of a
taxpayer's attempt to evade taxes through a section 351 transac-
tion .23
In conclusion, the qualified "transfer" requirement of section
351 has often been confused with, or lost in, the maze of cases
concerning the definition of the word "property" for purposes of
section 351. The Service's guidelines for what constitutes a bona
fide section 351 transfer have been even more befuddled as a
result of its misplaced reliance upon an unfounded and insup-
portable section 1235-351 analogy. In light of the DuPont rejec-
tion of the analogy between sections 1235 and 351,44 the taxpayer
has been granted a second opportunity to fashion transfer guide-
lines more consistent with the purpose and rational underlying
section 351.
section 351, inclusion of a field-of-use restriction is one means recognized by the Service
to avoid such a result. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (1965).
"' See the discussion of Rev. Rul. 64-56 and Rev. Rul. 71-564 at notes 202 and
accompanying text supra.
"' See the discussion of the Restatement definition of trade secret, as discussed in
Kewanee at notes 110-193 and accompanying text supra.
"I See notes 207-09 and accompanying text supra.
24 I.R.C. §§ 367, 482. See the discussion in note 237 and accompanying text supra.
"' See notes 226-32 and 237 and accompanying text supra.
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In conclusion, the primary goal of this section has been to
make the reader aware of the numerous weaknesses in the Serv-
ice's already attenuated line of analyses regarding the word
"transfer." Until the courts are presented with specific factual
settings, it is difficult to speculate as to the potential erosion of
the Service's position in the future.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis has attempted to demonstrate that
the standards adopted by the Service with respect to transfers
of know-how under section 351 are substantially without legal
foundation. The taxpayer seeking tax-free exchange treatment
would be well-advised to structure his agreement so that infor-
mation transferred is treated by the contracting parties as prop-
erty. Common sense also demands that the taxpayer label his
information in a manner consistent with the demanding property
rules under Revenue Procedure 69-19, and the equally onerous
"transfer" rules of Revenue Rulings 64-56 and 71-564. However,
the taxpayer must also recognize that the Service's rules are dis-
tortions of the law. If the taxpayer is willing to litigate with the
Service, he should attempt to stretch the concepts of property
and transfer to their limits. Once in court, the taxpayer's chances
of success should be far greater than those of the Service.
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